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I. INTRODUCTION
The current equity gap in private equity real estate (commercial real
estate not owned by public companies), or the tranche between an asset’s
current outstanding senior loan balance and a new senior loan balance
achievable via a refinancing or a new purchase money loan in connection
with a purchase and sale, is primarily driven by three factors: the maturity
wall, depressed valuations, and conservative lending practices.
The maturity wall results from the explosion of transaction activity that
took place from 2005-2007. A large number of these loans were for five-
year terms, and this number is even higher if loans of three years with
borrower extension options are included.1 In addition, as a result of the
recent crash in real estate values, many loans that were scheduled to ma-
ture in 2009, 2010, and 2011 have been extended by one to three years.2 As
a result of these factors, a large amount of debt originated during the mar-
ket peak is set to mature in 2012 and 2013 (and a staggering $1.2 trillion of
maturities is scheduled through 2015).3 Depressed valuations are evident:
as of the second quarter of 2011, the Moody’s/REAL Commercial Prop-
* Jon S. Robins is a partner with Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg LLP in the
firm’s Real Estate and Finance department. David E. Wallace is the Co-Founder of Strata
Investment Partners, LLC. Mark Franke is a J.D. Candidate, May 2013 at the University of
Michigan Law School, and an Associate Editor of Volume 01 of this Journal. He currently
serves as the Executive Articles Editor for Volume 02.
1. DELOITTE, REAL ESTATE SERVICES, COM. REAL ESTATE OUTLOOK: GENERATING
MOMENTUM FOR RECOVERY 7 (2010), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
Luxembourg/Local%20Assets/Documents/Whitepapers/2010/us_wp_realestatetop10issues_
04112010.pdf.
2. Id.
3. Id.
93
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\1-1\MPE104.txt unknown Seq: 2 31-JUL-12 9:52
94 Michigan Journal of Private Equity & Venture Capital Law [Vol. 1:93
erty Price Index (CPPI) was down approximately 40% from the market
peak (from Q2 2007 through Q1 2008).4 Lastly, senior lenders are employ-
ing more conservative lending practices that restrict proceeds by lower
loan to values ratios and tighter loan covenants that focus on in-place cash
flow and current as-is property valuations, rather than upside potential
and asset appreciation (based on aggressive lease-up assumptions, ex-
pected rent increases or anticipated improved market conditions).5
In addition to holding assets with distressed capital structures (with/
defined by equity gaps), private equity real estate faces operational liquid-
ity issues due to longer than anticipated hold periods with less cash flow
(due to increased vacancies and lower rents) to fund increasing capital and
leasing cost requirements. With a lack of reserves, inability to call capital,
and lack of access to the public equity markets, commercial real estate
often requires third party capital to refinance, hold, and manage their as-
sets in order to recoup value lost during the financial crisis. In addition,
with the first mortgage lenders offering loan proceeds based on lower val-
uations and using tighter underwriting standards, buyers acquiring real es-
tate often need additional or third party capital to bridge a shortfall
between the acquisition price and the sum of the first mortgage loan pro-
ceeds and available sponsor equity.
The aforementioned third party capital will be subordinate to the se-
nior loan due to senior mortgage covenants, yet senior to legacy equity
and to new sponsor equity. Preferred equity and mezzanine debt are alter-
native financing techniques that fit perfectly into these equity gap
tranches; they typically currently fund into the 60%-90% loan to value
range,6 or between a senior loan and subordinate equity. While preferred
equity and mezzanine debt remain popular alternative financing tech-
niques for new acquisitions, they also now play such a vital role in recapi-
talizing private equity real estate’s legacy assets that new funds are
forming to take advantage of their increased demand (and their bolstered
returns and yields in a low interest rate environment).   Consequently, it is
an appropriate time to review and examine the subtle and yet important
differences between these two alternative financing techniques.
This article will review both the genesis and the rise in popularity of
preferred equity and mezzanine debt, examine their legal and structural
differences, and provide some exposition as to how these financing tech-
niques work from security, collateral and control standpoints. We do not
undertake in this article to address the differences in tax and accounting
4. MIT CENTER FOR REAL ESTATE, MOODYS/REAL COMMERCIAL PROPERTY PRICE
INDEX (CPPI) (Nov. 7, 2011), http://web.mit.edu/cre/research/credl/rca.html.
5. JONATHAN D. MILLER, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, EMERGING TRENDS IN
REAL ESTATE 2011 17-18 (2010), available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/asset-management/
real-estate/assets/emerging-trends-real-estate-2011.pdf.
6. See, e.g. CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD SONNENBLICK-GOLDMAN, CAPITAL MARKETS
UPDATE (Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://www2.cushwake.com/sonngold/upload/
documents/MarketReport.pdf.
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treatment between mezzanine loans and preferred equity investments
both for either the mezzanine lender or preferred equity investor on the
one hand, or for the mezzanine borrower or the common equity investor,
on the other hand. In deciding upon which structure to use, transaction
participants should consult with their independent tax and accounting ad-
visors to ensure that the transaction is appropriately structured to best
meet their individual needs, subject to such compromise as may be neces-
sary to effect a desired transaction.
We proceed as follows: Section II outlines the legal principles of, and
the practical realities that have shaped, real estate finance from common
law to modernity. Section III begins with an exposition of the preferred
equity instruments and mezzanine debt that form the subject of this study.
It will start by outlining their qualities and follow with a delineation of the
organizational structures used in deals in which they form part of the capi-
tal structure. Lastly, it will proceed through theoretical and practical issues
for legal counsel to consider. Section IV will address an open issue, never,
to the authors’ knowledge, having been before a court: whether these
funding mechanisms should be treated as equitable mortgages according
to the common law equitable tradition to treat mortgage-like agreements
as mortgages. This Section will argue that these funding mechanisms
should not be treated as equitable mortgages. Finally, we will set forth our
conclusion in Section V.
II. COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FINANCE: FROM COMMON LAW
MORTGAGES TO EQUITY GAP FINANCING
In order to understand how the need for equity gap financing arose,
the reader must first understand the economic and legal realities of com-
mercial real estate finance. The most essential building block of real estate
finance is the mortgage.7 The mortgage typically provides the largest pro-
portion of capital and, through the authority ceded to the mortgage lender
in exchange for holding the risks inherent in such proportion, defines the
contours of the project’s capital structure through the covenants contained
in the mortgage agreement.8
A. Mortgage Law
A mortgage is a promise by one person, the mortgagor, to perform
obligations, usually the repayment of money loaned to the mortgagor and
memorialized in a promissory note, to another, the mortgagee.9 The mort-
7. See Andrew R. Berman, “Once a Mortgage, Always a Mortgage” – The Use (and
Misuse of) Mezzanine Loans and Preferred Equity Investments, 11 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 76
(2005) (noting that mortgages intended for inclusion in commercial mortgage backed securi-
ties are typically capped at 65%-75% loan to value ratios).
8. Id. at 100 (noting that most senior commercial mortgages intended for securitiza-
tion contain negative covenants against junior mortgages because rating agencies discour-
aged subordinated security interests in the underlying asset properties).
9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES) § 1.1 (1997).
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gagor conveys, or, where the mortgagee is the seller, the mortgagee re-
tains, an interest in real property10 as security for the mortgagor’s
performance of its obligations.11 Often, the main obligation is the repay-
ment of a loan lent by the mortgagee for the purpose of acquiring, refi-
nancing, constructing or renovating the mortgaged property.12 Today, the
most common mortgage form is where the mortgagor has the direct own-
ership interest in the subject property, while conveying a security interest,
or lien, to the mortgagee in the property that will be released once the
obligation to repay the debt evidenced by the promissory note has been
performed.13
The mortgagee’s primary remedy against the mortgagor for failure to
perform obligations is the process known as foreclosure. Upon default and
after the expiration of any cure period, the mortgagee may foreclose on its
lien on the real property.14 The process is called “foreclosure” because it
forecloses the mortgagor’s right to redeem the property.15 The mortga-
gor’s right to redeem has its origins in courts of equity and will be dis-
cussed more below.16
The time required to foreclose the mortgagor’s redemption right and
the methods for accomplishing the foreclosure vary by jurisdiction. In
some states, no judicial action is required, and the mortgagee may sell, at a
sheriff’s sale, the property pursuant to a power of sale contained in the
mortgage or deed of trust.17 Typically, in these states the mortgagor’s right
to redeem is limited by statute to a short period after written notice is
given by the mortgagee and the sale forecloses all rights to redeem.18 In
others, where judicial action is required, the time period required to fore-
10. The technical nature of this interest varies by jurisdiction. Most jurisdictions con-
sider the mortgage to be a lien upon the mortgagor’s fee estate. Other jurisdictions consider
the grant to be a conveyance of title. In either case, under modern law, the practical effect for
most if not all purposes under each theory is that of a lien.
11. Id.
12. See id. (noting that the obligation is usually payment of money under a promissory
note); See also id. at 1.4 (providing that no matter the terms of the obligation, the obligation
must be measurable in monetary terms).
13. Id. §1.1.
14. GLENN G. MUNN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 243 (Bankers Pub.
Co., 5th ed. 1949).
15. Id.
16. See the discussion of the equity of redemption doctrine, supra in the current sec-
tion and infra Section IV, for more on the mortgagor’s right to redeem.
17. See, e.g., TEXAS TITLE EXAMINATION STANDARDS, Std. 16.10 (outlining the ele-
ments that an examiner must establish to verify power of sale).
18. See, e.g. In re Grant, 303 B.R. 205 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2003) (holding that under Ne-
vada law, transfer of foreclosed property becomes final upon sale, not filing of title with
registry). See also MARIA MILANO, COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FINANCING: THE BOR-
ROWER’S PERSPECTIVE TOUGH TIMES NOTWITHSTANDING, THERE ARE WAYS FOR THE COM-
MERCIAL REAL ESTATE BORROWER TO USE THE LENDING PROCESS TO ITS ADVANTAGE,
Prac. Real Est. Law, 39, 47 (2009) (noting that under Washington state law, a mortgagee has
up to 11 days before the foreclosure sale to redeem).
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close is not defined by statute, but is determined by the time necessary for
the consummation of the judicial process.19 The practical effect of the judi-
cial foreclosure process is often to extend the period during which the
mortgagor may redeem the property.20 There are many jurisdictional vari-
ations of the foreclosure process, but the judicial sale versus the non-judi-
cial sale is the primary point of differentiation.
Mortgages touch and concern real property and, therefore, belong to
property law. Mortgages are also contracts between parties memorializing
promises and, therefore, also belong to contract law. Early in the evolution
of English common law, there were unsettled tensions between enforcing
the terms of a contract and the greater protections against forfeiture af-
forded under property law.21 More often than not, courts would enforce
the terms of an agreement, even where it would result in inequitable ends.
As more and more unsuspecting mortgagors were forced to forfeit
their estates under the terms of mortgage contracts, courts of equity grew
suspicious of such intrusions on the traditional protections afforded under
property law.22 Recognizing that the mortgagee was essentially providing
capital to prospective landowners for purchases of real property, courts
began to treat these arrangements as creditor-debtor relationships and to
limit recourse for creditors to a claim for money.23 Courts of equity also
began to recognize a title in equity vested in the mortgagor.24
These equitable innovations underpin the equity of redemption doc-
trine. The equity of redemption doctrine allows borrowers to avoid the
formal contractual provisions that require them to forfeit their land in the
19. See, e.g., NEW YORK REAL PROP. ACTS §1352.
20. See Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1403 (2004) (outlining the “time-consuming
and costly” judicial foreclosure process). A survey of foreclosure information websites shows
that most predict a New York foreclosure to take anywhere from 3 months to 18 months. See,
e.g., How Long Does the Typical Foreclosure Process take in New York? LAW INFO (last
visited Mar. 25, 2012), available at http://resources.lawinfo.com/en/Legal-FAQs/Foreclosure/
New-York/how-long-does-the-typical-foreclosure-process.html (suggesting 6-18 months);
see also, e.g. New York Forclosure Laws, RealtyTrac (last visited Mar. 25, 2012), available
at http://www.realtytrac.com/foreclosure-laws/new-york-foreclosure-laws.asp (suggesting 15
months); New York Foreclosure Laws, FORECLOSURE.COM (last visited Mar. 25, 2012), avail-
able at http://www.foreclosure.com/statelaw_NY.html (suggesting an uncontested foreclosure
takes 120-180 days).
21. Berman, supra note 7, at 119. See also Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructure of
Markets: The Role of Contract and Property Law, 73 B.U. L. REV. 389, 395 (1993).
22. Berman, supra note 7, at 119.
23. Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Seventeenth-Century Revolution in the English Land Law,
43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 221, 298 (1995). See also Ann M. Burkhart, Lenders and Land, 64 MO.
L. REV. 249, 260-61, 264 (1999) (noting that the repeal of a prohibition on charging interest
by the English parliament led to lenders allowing borrowers to retain their interest in the
land, and eventually led to a re-characterization of the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship to
a debtor-creditor relationship).
24. Reid, supra note 22, at 298.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\1-1\MPE104.txt unknown Seq: 6 31-JUL-12 9:52
98 Michigan Journal of Private Equity & Venture Capital Law [Vol. 1:93
event of default.25 Originally, the equity of redemption doctrine required
mortgagors to show fraud or other equitable grounds for the recovery of
their property, but by the earlier part of the 17th century, courts afforded
any mortgagor the doctrine’s protection.26 Courts began to view mort-
gages as loans collateralized by real property.27
During this time period, the rights available to a mortgagee upon de-
fault began to reflect the rights they have today. In the event of default,
the mortgagee can realize upon the property, but only after going through
the necessary process to foreclose the mortgagor’s equity of redemption.
Until that process is completed, the mortgagor retains the right to redeem
its property through fulfilling its obligations under the mortgage
agreement.28
Once any cure period under the mortgage document has expired, the
mortgagee is entitled to accelerate the secured debt. In most jurisdictions,
once the debt has been accelerated, the mortgagor must pay all obligations
in full in order to redeem the property.29 However, in some jurisdictions,
where a power of sale process is used, the mortgagor may need only cure
the underlying default to redeem.30 In most jurisdictions, the period for
redemption of the mortgage ends upon the foreclosure sale,31 but in sev-
eral jurisdictions statutes define a period after the foreclosure during
which the mortgagor’s right to redeem continues to exist.32
With the rise of the equity of redemption doctrine, mortgagees began
attempting to secure waivers of the mortgagor’s right to redemption or to
25. See GEORGE E. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 6, at 12
(West 2d ed. 1970) (1951); see also Berman, supra note 7, at 86.
26. See Burkhart, supra note 23, at 264 (1999). Note, however, that the attachment of
the equity of redemption to a mortgage is different than finding an alternative loan structure
an equitable mortgage. See also, Laurence G. Preble & David C. Cartwright, Convertible and
Shared Appreciation Loans: Unclogging the Equity of Redemption, 20 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 821 (1985) (showing that for an equitable mortgage finding to attach, there must be
some equitable ground, not a mere resemblance to a mortgage).
27. Burkhart, supra note 23, at 264 (1999).
28. Id.
29. See e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS §1341 (McKinney 1962) (requiring the “defendant
[to pay] into [the] court the amount due for principal and interest” plus costs and administra-
tive expenses in order dismiss the foreclosure action or stay the sale).
30. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924 (West 2011) (providing that if the amount is cura-
ble under § 2924c, then that is sufficient to redeem). See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924c (West
2011) (providing that the amount necessary to redeem is that amount which is due on ac-
count of the default “other than the portion of principal as would not then be due had no
default occurred”).
31. See, e.g., NEW YORK REAL PROP. ACTS §1352 (providing that a judgment shall fix
the amount of time during with the right to redeem the property exists).
32. See Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1404 (2004) (showing that in some statuto-
rily defined redemption periods, the mortgagor may redeem for up to a year after foreclosure
sale). See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §600.3140 (providing for a right to redeem for six
months following foreclosure sale).
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craft agreements intended to hide their nature as a mortgage in order to
avoid the protections afforded to borrowers under the doctrine.33 Recog-
nizing this, courts would always look to the substance of the agreement to
determine whether it was a mortgage. Where a court determined it was a
mortgage, the court would unequivocally limit mortgagees’ recourse ac-
cording to the equity of redemption doctrine.34 As Chaplin put it:
“[There were] several forms of conveyance in use, no one of them professing
to create a mere lien, all diverted from their original office, all warped away in
operation from their language, all nevertheless, diverse as they were, resulting
in one and the same contract.”35
The trend to look to the substance of the agreement led to the popular
adage, “once a mortgage, always a mortgage.”36
As time passed, the mortgagor’s equitable title in land independent of
the legal form of the agreement gained traction in more courts and eventu-
ally became unassailable, even if the contract did not vest legal title in the
mortgagor. With this recognition of title, mortgagors were able to secure
loans subordinated to their original mortgage with the property.37 Thus
arose junior mortgages.
B. Junior Mortgages
A junior mortgage acts like a first mortgage in that the mortgagee
takes a security interest in the underlying property, but it is second to the
first mortgage in lien priority.38 Where the mortgaged property is sold at
foreclosure, the purchaser takes the property free of the foreclosed mort-
gage and any junior mortgages (subject to redemption rights in those juris-
dictions providing for any post-foreclosure statutory redemption period).
Following the foreclosure sale, a junior mortgagee will only receive any
proceeds remaining after the obligations secured by the senior mortgage
are paid in full.
The same is true in a liquidation under bankruptcy law. Where a bor-
rower becomes insolvent and files for a liquidation form of bankruptcy,39 a
junior lender would be paid only to the extent that there are residual funds
left over after payment in full of the senior mortgage obligations.40 Any
outstanding amount of the junior mortgage beyond the residual amount
after the senior mortgage is paid would be considered unsecured and,
33. See Osborne, supra note 25, §21 for one interesting example of mortgagor’s at-
tempts to avoid the equity of redemption doctrine, the “trust deed mortgage.”
34. Id.
35. H. W. Chaplin, The Story of Mortgage Law, 4 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11 (1890) (altera-
tion in original).
36. See Berman, supra note 7, at 87.
37. Id. at 89.
38. See In re Midway Partners, 995 F.2d 490, 495 (4th Cir. 1993) (outlining the process
of curing loans of different priority).
39. Possible under chapter 7 or chapter 11.
40. In re Midway Partners, 995 F.2d at 495.
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therefore, would only be repaid to the extent that other unsecured credi-
tors are paid through the pro rata distribution of the estate proceeds.41
As explained in a moment, with the rise of structured finance, rating
agencies began to disapprove of junior liens upon properties securing the
loans included in mortgage-backed securities. This set the stage for the
widespread adoption of the funding mechanisms that are the subject of
this study, preferred equity investments and mezzanine loans.
C. Credit Ratings and the Rise of Preferred Equity Investments and
Mezzanine Debt Financing
Securitization of mortgages first came to widespread use as a method
to increase liquidity in the housing market, first by government-sponsored
enterprises (GSE) and later by “private label” securities issuers as well.42
The GSEs and “private label” issuers buy mortgages from originating
lenders, sell them to investors, and then take money from these sales to
buy more mortgages, thus providing a continual, robust source of liquidity
for the housing market beyond the traditional funding model where banks
made loans from the deposits they received from customers.43
Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities (CMBS) grew in prominence
in the wake of the savings and loans crisis that traversed the threshold
between the 1980s and 1990s.44 Congress created the Resolution Trust
Corporation (RTC) to bail out the thrift institution industry, which was
imperiled by a dive in commercial real estate values.45 The RTC’s mission
was to liquidate the assets of insolvent thrifts as quickly as possible.46 To
do so, the RTC began to pool commercial mortgages, which made up the
majority of the insolvent thrifts’ balance sheets, into CMBS for sale to
investors.47 After the RTC wound up its business, a private market of
CMBS issuers continued to generate and sell CMBS.48
The mortgage-backed securities (MBS) market provides liquidity to
the real estate market in three ways. First, a great number of institutional
41. For the calculation of secured and unsecured portions of an allowed claim, see 11
U.S.C. § 506(a)(1). For the rules on pro rata distribution amongst unsecured creditors, see 11
U.S.C. § 726(a)(2) (providing that allowed unsecured claims take lower priority than allowed
secured claims). See also 11 U.S.C. § 726 (b) (providing that all members of a class of claims
shall receive pro rata distributions from the proceeds of the estate property’s liquidation).
42. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, 112TH CONG., THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY REP. 425
(Comm’n Print 2011), available at http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/report (last visited Apr. 26,
2011) [hereinafter FCIC Report].
43. Id.
44. See Yevgeniya Drobitskaya, TALF and Revenue Procedure 2009-45: New Hope for
the Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities Market, 29 REV. BANKING & FIN L. 41, 41
(2010).
45. FCIC Report, supra note 42, at 425.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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investors are able to invest in them under their investment guidelines, be-
cause their guidelines allow for such investors to invest in bonds while
prohibiting investment in individual mortgages.49 Second, the risk-based
capital and reserve requirements for banks and insurance companies re-
quire lower capital reserves for bond holdings than for actual mortgage
loans.50 Lastly, the due diligence requirements for purchasing MBS are
generally lower and the transaction documentation is simpler and less
thorough because of the perceived risk mitigation provided by pooling,
diversification, and tranching.51 Low diligence requirements and minimal
documentation lower transaction costs. All of these factors combine to
provide and free up more capital to feed the mortgage origination and
securitization machine.
MBS are not only a method to feed the liquidity needs of the real es-
tate market, but also provide what is perceived as a safe investment oppor-
tunity (although the recent financial crisis has cast doubt on this
perception).52 Safety is provided in three ways as well. First, the creation
of a pool of mortgages in a security rather than just one mortgage de-
creases the risk of material loss, because in order for the security to lose a
significant amount of its value, many of the mortgages in the pool would
have to go bad.53 However, large single mortgages, typically large com-
mercial mortgages, may be securitized standing alone, so pooling is not
49. See Alan R. Palmiter, Staying Public: Institutional Investors in U.S. Capital Mar-
kets, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 245, 267 (2009) (“The guidelines [for public pension
funds, major institutional investors,] place restrictive caps on private assets (such as . . . pri-
vate mortgages), given their greater illiquidity and risk.”) (alteration in original).
50. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capi-
tal Measurement and Capital Standards, at 120, 20 (Revised Edition, Basel II, June 2004)
(showing that the risk weight for the purposes of determining capital requirements for a
AAA rated asset-backed security is 20%, at 120, while claims secured by commercial mort-
gages typically justify a risk weighting of 100%, at 20), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbs107b.pdf.
The Basel III requirements are in the process of implementation worldwide, which will
increase capital requirements in general, but see Hansen, et al., A Macroprudential Approach
to Financial Regulation, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, (forthcoming July 2011) (explaining the dif-
ference between liquidity regulation and capital requirements, supporting the notion that
liquidity may not be affected by capital requirement holdings), available at www.economics.
harvard.edu%2Ffaculty%2Fstein%2Ffiles%2FJEP-macroprudential-July22-2010.pdf.
51. Firms generally took the position that these securities did not require careful scru-
tiny. See FCIC Report, supra note 42, at 168 (noting that Morgan Stanley’s head of due
diligence had only two to five outside contractors reporting to him on due diligence for
securitization pools).
52. But see Azam Amed, Bonds Backed by Mortgages Regain Allure, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Feb. 18, 2012 1:30 PM) (suggesting that the MBS market may be rebounding),
available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/18/bonds-backed-by-mortgages-regain-
allure/.
53. FCIC Report, supra note 42, at 43.
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always used.54 Second, these pools are often structured to provide diversi-
fication of asset class, geography, and borrower demographic.55 Third,
tranching of the securities further mitigates risk. Tranching is a process by
which a security is divided into classes according to payment priority.
Lower priority tranches absorb losses from failing assets underlying the
security first. Therefore, tranching allows for investors to choose the
tranche they wish to invest in based on their risk aversion.56 Tranching is
especially important in the context of a security backed by a single mort-
gage because the security does not benefit from the first two risk mitiga-
tion techniques listed here.
Investors in CMBS relied heavily upon risk analyses of the major
credit rating agencies.57 Rating agencies published guidance on what risk
mitigation mechanisms these agencies wanted to see in the mortgages doc-
uments governing the underlying mortgage loans that backed CMBS,58
which in turn drove the financial structure of the individual deals.59 These
agencies strongly discouraged securities packagers from including mort-
gages with more than one lien on the underlying property. In order to
comport with this guidance, the originators of commercial mortgages be-
gan to include negative covenants in the senior mortgage that prohibited
junior mortgages.60
At the height of the credit bubble, commercial mortgage lenders would
generally provide 65-75% or more of the capital needed to complete
deals.61 Together with the recommendation against junior mortgages, the
remaining financing gap required dealmakers to seek alternative funding
mechanisms.62 As noted in the introduction, the need to refinance proper-
ties in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008 has created a new equity gap,
the difference between the outstanding balance of the existing senior loan
and the amount available from an alternative lender under a first mort-
gage loan to refinance the existing loan or fund the acquisition of a mort-
54. See Few Big CMBS Loans Set to Mature in 2009, Commercial Mortgage Alert
(Nov. 22, 2008) (providing a discussion of single loans and participation interests in large
loans that were securitized), available at http://www.cmalert.com/headlines.php?hid=138222.
55. Cf. FCIC Report supra note 42, Dissent n. 7, at 439 (criticizing the “bad analytic
models” used by rating agencies that assumed the impossibility of a correlated downturn in
housing across regions); See also, id. at 425 (speaking to diversification, generally).
56. FCIC Report, supra note 42, at 43.
57. Berman, supra note 7, at 94.
58. Id. at 98 (indicating the rating agencies make their criteria known by way of vari-
ous public mediums).
59. See FCIC Report, supra note 42, at 206.
60. Id. at 100-101 (noting that all the major rating agencies discourage junior debts of
any kind by proclaimed their adverse credit effect on senior debt, but that the agencies “ab-
hor” junior mortgages because the underlying collateral is identical to the senior mortgage
collateral).
61. Berman, supra note 7, at 104.
62. Joseph Forte, Mezzanine Finance: A Legal Background, in COMMERCIAL SECURI-
TIZATION FOR REAL ESTATE LAWYERS 441-42 (2005).
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gaged property. The legal and practical treatment of these mechanisms
will be the same, no matter the source of the demand.
In order to fill this gap in financing, real estate dealmakers must find
mezzanine level financing mechanisms that comport with the negative cov-
enants in the senior mortgage or that will otherwise be permitted by the
mortgagee. This article will look at two types of such mechanisms that
have received considerable attention in the past few years: preferred eq-
uity investments and mezzanine debt.
III. PREFERRED EQUITY INVESTMENTS AND MEZZANINE
DEBT FINANCING
A. Preferred Equity and Mezzanine Debt – Capital Structure
and Characteristics
Preferred equity and mezzanine debt occupy a structurally subordinate
position to the senior mortgage lender in the capital structure of a deal.63
If the capital structure were to include both mezzanine debt and preferred
equity, the mezzanine debt holders would take priority over the preferred
equity holders, but where there is only one or the other, either would be
second in line to the senior mortgage with any common equity holders
subordinated below either of them.64
The term “preferred equity” is very broad, denoting instruments or in-
vestment positions that exist on a spectrum from more equity-like to more
debt-like.65 On the equity end of the spectrum, for example, preferred eq-
uity may simply refer to an equity position that is entitled to payment
before other equity holders out of cash flow, capital events, or both. A
preferred member may also be entitled to a share of residual cash flow at
the sale of the property.
Often, a preferred member will sacrifice a greater return at exit in ex-
change for more certainty during the life of the project, which leads us to
the more debt-like end of the spectrum. For instance, the preferred mem-
ber agreement may call for monthly or quarterly distributions at a fixed
rate regardless of whether or not there is cash flow to sustain the distribu-
tion. It may also require a fixed, mandatory redemption date.66 Instru-
ments on the debt end of the spectrum tend to be treated as economic
equivalents to mezzanine loans by market participants.67 At this end of
63. Berman, supra note 7, at 79.
64. See Berman, Symposium, A Festschrift in Honor of Dale A. Whitman: Risks and
Realities of Mezzanine Loans, 72 MO. L. REV. 993, 1000 (2007) (indicating that the mezza-
nine debt will always be senior to equity interests in the mortgaged collateral and the mort-
gage borrower).
65. For a discussion of preferred stock and its flexibility under Delaware law, see
Gregg Schoenberg, Business Valuations, HBS Delaware Corporation & LLC Blog (Mar. 21,
2012), available at http://blog.delawareinc.com/2009/04/101-preferred-stock/.
66. See Berman, supra note 7, at 80.
67. See ACCOUNTING FOR CERTAIN FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS WITH CHARACTERISTICS
OF BOTH LIABILITIES AND EQUITY, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 150 (Fin.
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the spectrum, a preferred equity instrument will have a rate of return simi-
lar to a mezzanine loan, but the preferred instrument may obtain a slightly
better return because of its structurally subordinate position to any credi-
tors of the entity in which the preferred equity member holds its interest
and because they are likely subject to state law distribution constraints.68
For the purposes of private equity real estate financing, mezzanine
lending is “‘. . . lending to a borrowing entity or group of entities that
directly or indirectly owns a real property-owning entity, which debt is
secured by a perfected first security interest in the mezzanine borrower’s
pledged ownership interests in the property owner. . . .’”69 While commer-
cial real estate developers have long sought additional leverage beyond
what is available through a first mortgage, with the advent of structured
finance, combined with the danger of real estate bubbles followed by rapid
devaluation in real estate values, lenders and rating agencies have sought
additional protection for senior loans by avoiding second liens on real
property.70 The mezzanine loan is therefore intentionally not a mortgage,
but a debt transaction secured by personal property interests, the member-
ship interests in a lower level real property-owning entity.71
We now turn to an exposition of the organizational structures and rela-
tionship of entities in the capital structure of commercial real estate deals.
B. Organizational Structures and Relationships
Complex organizational relationships form the legal structure of com-
mercial real estate projects with mezzanine loans and preferred equity in-
vestments in their capital structures. Typically, the senior lender requires
the mortgage borrower to be a single purpose entity (SPE) that is bank-
ruptcy-remote72 (hereinafter “Borrower SPE”) and that exists for the pur-
pose of owning the underlying mortgaged property and to receive the
senior mortgage proceeds from a lender (hereinafter “Senior Lender”) for
the purchase of such property.73 Where a mezzanine lender is part of the
capital structure of a project, Senior Lenders will usually require an upper-
tier entity to exist for the sole purpose of owning the membership interests
Accounting Standards Bd. 2003) (requiring firms to treat more debt like preferred instru-
ments as debt on their balance sheets).
68. See infra Section III.G.2 for a discussion of distribution constraints and preferred
equity positions.
69. James D. Prendergast, Real Estate Mezzanine Lending Collateral Foreclosure In-
surance Tailored to the Operation of the U.C.C. Is Not A Luxury - It’s A Necessity, PRAC.
REAL EST. LAW 11, 12 (2011) (quoting DANIEL B. RUBOCK, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., US
CMBS AND CRE CDO: MOODY’S APPROACH TO RATING COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE
MEZZANINE LOANS 3 (2007)), available at http://dirt.umkc.edu/attachments/MDYMEZZ%20
Loans.pdf).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. That is, the impact of such entity’s insolvency or bankruptcy has little or no effect
on the other discrete entities in the organizational structure.
73. This article will assume that the SPEs are Limited Liability Companies (LLC).
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in the Borrower SPE (hereinafter, “Owning SPE”). The Owning SPE then
pledges the membership interests in the Borrower SPE as collateral for
the mezzanine loan made directly to the Owning SPE.74 Where the Bor-
rower SPE is a limited partnership, generally the Owning SPE will own all
of the limited partnership interests in the Borrower SPE and will own all
of the shares or member interests, as applicable in the sole general partner
of the Borrower SPE. In this way, the Owning SPE owns, directly and
indirectly, 100% of the equity in the Borrower SPE.
In the case of preferred equity members, the Senior Lender will also
generally require the Owning SPE structure described above. The pre-
ferred equity member will hold its preferred membership interests in the
Owning SPE.75 The existence of the Owning SPE has the effect of elimi-
nating any direct recourse available to any Owning SPE investors or debt
holders to the underlying property, which is owned by the Borrowing SPE,
thus comporting with the prohibitions against junior liens on the property
in the senior mortgage agreement.76
Typically, a sponsor party (hereinafter, “Sponsor”) will bring the trans-
action to the financing source, be it a mezzanine lender or a preferred
equity investor. The Sponsor, or a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Spon-
sor, will generally be the managing member of the Owning SPE. The
Sponsor will contribute capital at the common equity level and then seek
out a preferred member or a mezzanine lender to contribute to filling the
remaining gap in financing needed to consummate the project. Together,
the preferred member and the Sponsor provide the capital to an Owning
SPE, which, in turn, owns all the shares of the mortgage Borrower SPE.77
Similarly, in the mezzanine financing scenario, the Sponsor owns and
controls the Owning SPE that, in turn, owns all the membership interests
of the Borrower SPE, and the mezzanine loan flows to the Owning SPE.78
Thus, the highest tiers of the structure of these organizational relationships
differ, while the foundations are generally similar. While there are many
74. See Prendergast, supra note 69, at 11-12 (defining mezzanine loan in a real estate
context as “lending to a borrowing entity or group of entities that directly or indirectly owns
a real property-owning entity, which debt is secured by a perfected first security interest in
the mezzanine borrower’s pledged ownership interests in the property owner”). See also
Berman, supra note 64, at 999 (noting that the lenders require mezzanine borrowers to be
special-purpose, bankruptcy-remote, entities).
75. Id. at 79.
76. Berman, supra note 64, at 1000 (showing that collateral for a mezzanine loan,
though related to the cash flows and value of the property that forms the security interest for
the senior mortgage, is the shares of the SPE and, therefore, recourse is limited to foreclo-
sure on such shares. The same is true for preferred equity members, whose recourse for
nonpayment is limited to the assumption of control of the SPE).
77. Many times, these capital sources will not fill the total gap. The remainder would
in that case be filled by other debt or common equity investments.
78. Berman, supra note 64, at 1016 (noting that mezzanine lender owns “Equity Inter-
ests in special purpose entities with no assets other than equity ownership in yet another
entity that may directly or indirectly own the underlying 1016 real property which is itself
subject to a securitized first mortgage.”).
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variations in the structure of these deals, for the purposes of this article,
the authors will assume the structures as outlined here. Figures 1 and 2
illustrate these structures and the actors involved in simplified form.
The mezzanine lender’s relationship with the Owning SPE is memori-
alized in a loan agreement and the membership interests of the Borrower
SPE are pledged through a pledge agreement. The mezzanine lender is
also party to an inter-creditor agreement that defines the mezzanine
lender’s relationship with the Senior Lender. The preferred member’s eq-
uity position is memorialized in the operating agreement of the Owning
SPE.
FIGURE 1: SIMPLIFIED STRUCTURE WITH MEZZANINE LOAN
Senior
Mortgage
Lender
Borrower
SPE
Sponsor/
Managing
Member
Underlying
Asset
Mezzanine
Lender
Owning SPE
Owns membership interests
of Borrower SPE
Pledges
shares of
Borrower
SPE
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FIGURE 2: SIMPLIFIED PREFERRED EQUITY STRUCTURE
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C. Remedies upon Default or Breach
In the event of default on the mezzanine loan agreement or breach of
the preferred member rights under the operating agreement, the remedies
differ in both procedure and substance.
In a case where the Owning SPE defaults on its mezzanine debt, the
mezzanine lender may foreclose on the security interest it maintains on
the Borrower SPE membership interests.79 The mezzanine lender then
must try to sell the membership interests to collect on its investment, usu-
ally through a collateral auction.80 Alternatively, with the debtor’s post-
default consent, the mezzanine lender may simply retain the equity inter-
ests in full or partial satisfaction of the secured debt in accordance with
procedures outlined by the UCC.81 Often the mezzanine lender is unable
to find a buyer for the pledged interests at an acceptable price and is
forced to buy them itself generally with a credit bid in an amount equal to
some portion or, occasionally, all of the mezzanine loan debt amount. This
results in the mezzanine lender effectively stepping into the shoes of the
Owning SPE because the mezzanine lender takes over the membership
79. See Berman, supra note 7, at 108.
80. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-702 (2012) (providing that the membership inter-
ests in a limited liability company are assignable).
81. See U.C.C. § 9-620 (2000) for procedures for acceptance.
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interests in the Borrower SPE through the UCC sale.82 Upon the sale of
the security interests of the mezzanine lender to itself or the acceptance of
the collateral as partial or full satisfaction of the obligations under the loan
agreement, the Sponsor’s indirect equity position in the Borrowing SPE
(via its membership interest in the Owning SPE), along with any other
equity holder’s position is wiped out.
In the case of the preferred equity member, the process is more direct.
Where the SPE fails to meet its obligations under the operating agree-
ment, the preferred member usually assumes management control by re-
placing the Sponsor as the managing member of the Owning SPE and
often the Sponsor loses all or almost all voting and other decisional
rights.83 While both the preferred equity member and the mezzanine
lender end up controlling the Borrowing SPE, the mezzanine lender extin-
guishes the Sponsor’s rights and interest in the asset because it takes own-
ership of membership interests of the Borrower SPE, which owns the asset
property, through the UCC sale. The preferred member generally does
not extinguish the Sponsor’s economic rights. Under most agreements, af-
ter the change of management control, the preferred member is often enti-
tled to receive all free cash flow and capital event proceeds, to the
exclusion of the Sponsor, until all of its accrued preferred return has been
paid and the full amount of its equity investment has been returned. Addi-
tionally, many agreements provide for an increased rate of return to the
preferred member following a change of control event.
Compare this with the mezzanine lender’s recourse in terms of timing:
the mezzanine lender, governed by the applicable state law version of the
UCC, must undergo a process for the public sale84 of the collateral. Such a
sale takes time, and money to orchestrate. In both the cases of a preferred
equity investment and a mezzanine loan, the holder of the investment in-
strument is likely to be an outsider to the day-to-day management of the
Owning SPE and the Borrower SPE and therefore will have limited infor-
mation on the details of the company. As result of its potentially limited
information, such holders may want to do additional due diligence on en-
vironmental compliance and other strict liability regimes prior to assuming
control of the Borrower SPE.85
Moreover, there may be additional administrative costs to ensure that
the sale of the collateral is commercially reasonable under UCC § 9-
610(b). Factors considered for the reasonableness of the sale include:
82. Id.
83. Forte, supra note 62, at 442 (commenting that foreclosure on the shares is unneces-
sary because the preferred equity member already owns the shares).
84. See Berman, supra note 64, at 1016 for a discussion of why the mezzanine lender
chooses to sell the collateral at a public sale.
85. See e.g., RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1976).
See BROUN, ET.AL, 1 RCRA AND SUPERFUND: A PRACTICE GUIDE § 5:30 (3d ed. 2011) (not-
ing that the standard is strict liability, codifying an expanded version of the common law
public nuisance standard).
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whether it was disposed of “in the usual manner on any recognized mar-
ket,” “at the price current in any recognized market,” or the sale is “other-
wise in conformity to commercial practices,”86 or is approved by creditors
or the judiciary.87 The issue of price can be particularly vexing for the
mezzanine lender in this context because there is a small market for the
membership interests in the Owning SPE. Therefore, as Berman notes, the
mezzanine lender “is left with the circular definition that a commercially
reasonable sale is one that is ‘otherwise in conformity with reasonable
commercial practices.’”88
Where the proceeds received from the UCC auction—whether from a
third party bidder or, as a result of a credit bid from the mezzanine
lender—are less than the outstanding amount of the debt, the mezzanine
lender may be able to seek a deficiency judgment against the mezzanine
borrower or any guarantor to attempt to recoup more of its investment.
But this would depend on whether the mezzanine loan agreement pro-
vided for recourse or, as is more typical, non-recourse.89 A non-recourse
loan is one where the lender is limited to the collateral pledged for satis-
faction of the obligations under the agreement.90 Under a non-recourse
loan, therefore, the mezzanine lender could not look to the Owning SPE
itself for satisfaction of the mezzanine loan obligations, foreclosing the op-
portunity to seek a deficiency judgment. In the world of single asset real
estate mezzanine lending, the Owning SPE will generally not have any
assets other than the pledged equity in the Borrower SPE, and so the per-
sonal recourse to the Owning SPE is generally meaningless as a practical
matter.
Often, the mezzanine loan documents will provide for recourse for cer-
tain acts or certain types of liabilities. To make this recourse meaningful,
the mezzanine lender will require that such recourse liabilities be guaran-
teed by someone other than the Owning SPE. If the non-recourse loan or
preferred equity investment has a non-recourse carve-out, it will be guar-
anteed by specific people for amounts resulting from specified acts.91 The
goal of non-recourse carve-outs is to provide incentive against filing for
bankruptcy92 and other bad acts specified in the carve-out guaranty by
86. U.C.C . § 9-627(b) (2007).
87. Id. § 9-627(c) (2007).
88. Berman, supra note 64, at 1017.
89. See Glenn G. Munn, Recourse, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 578,
available at http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112101457119?urlappend=%3Bseq=586, for a
standard definition of recourse.
90. See Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784, 793 n. 6 (Del. Ch. 1992).
91. “Non-Recourse Carve-out” is a misnomer, though widely used in the industry. The
mechanism in fact carves out a portion of a larger non-recourse loan and provides recourse to
the lender for a specified amount from specified guarantors, which would cut in favor of
calling it a “recourse carve-out.” See In re Extended Stay Inc., 418 B.R. 49, 54 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2009) (describing a “non-recourse carve-out” as a guaranty agreement entered into
with respect to a non-recourse mezzanine loan).
92. Id. at 60.
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ensuring the guarantors’ liability on debts of a bankrupt entity is not dis-
charged with the debtor’s personal liability for the debt.93
If the mezzanine loan document provides for recourse, or to the extent
that there was a non-recourse carve-out, the mezzanine lender will have to
show commercial reasonableness of the sale in order to seek a deficiency
judgment and to enforce it against the guarantor.94 Many pledge agree-
ments for mezzanine loans contain safe harbor provisions that provide for
an agreed process for the UCC sale that, when followed, parties will deem
the sale per se commercially reasonable. Such a safe harbor is intended to
forestall the debtor from challenging the commercial reasonableness of
the sale and to provide an indication of what the parties agreed to be com-
mercially reasonable terms. In all cases, however, a sale must be commer-
cially reasonable, and any challenge to the commercial reasonableness of
the sale made in any action brought by the mezzanine lender upon any
deficiency or in any other challenge to the sale would certainly, even if
unsuccessful, add to litigation costs performed under the billable hour of
counsel.
D. Perfection of Mezzanine Loan Collateral95
One issue particular to mezzanine loans is the perfection of the secur-
ity interest in the collateral shares of the Borrower SPE. The collateral
shares of the Borrower SPE will be governed by Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) unless they are considered investment securi-
ties, in which case they will be governed by Article 8 and by Article 9.
In order to be considered an investment security and therefore be gov-
erned under Article 8, the issuer (for our purposes, the Borrower SPE)
must expressly opt for its equity interests to be governed by Article 8 in its
constitutive documents and, if the interests are represented by a certifi-
cate, the certificate must contain a legend stating that the interest repre-
sented by the certificate is governed by Article 8.96 In a case where the
issuer opts for Article 8 governance, the interests are governed by Article
8 as “securities”, and Article 9 as “investment property.”97
For consistency, the authors will continue to generally assume that the
Owning SPE and the Borrowing SPE are limited liability companies, al-
93. 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2006) (providing that, as a general matter, the effect of dis-
charge of a debtor does not affect the liability of another any other entity with respect to the
discharged debt).
94. See, e.g., Vornado PS, L.L.C. v. Primestone Inv. Partners, L.P., 821 A.2d 296, 315
(Del. Ch. 2002), aff’d sub nom. 822 A.2d 397 (Del. 2003) (holding that lender showed com-
mercial reasonableness and therefore deficiency judgment challenge by borrower failed).
95. Berman, supra note 64, at 998. Andrew Berman has expertly described the process
for perfecting a security interest under Article 9 and much of this section will follow his
outline. Citations will be made to the U.C.C. where universally true and to Berman where
the authors of this study draw upon insights unique to his work.
96. U.C.C. § 8-102(15) (1994).
97. Berman, supra note 64, at 1003.
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though these SPEs can be limited partnerships or, theoretically (though
rare in practice), corporations.98 In general, the concepts discussed in this
article apply the same to limited partnerships as to limited liability compa-
nies, notwithstanding that the terms of the discussion refer to limited lia-
bility companies. However, limited partnerships and limited liability
companies are creatures of state statutes, and the laws with respect to
them, including, potentially the laws of fiduciary duty, vary not only be-
tween jurisdictions but between limited partnerships and limited liability
companies. As such, when considering any particular situation in a given
jurisdiction, it is imperative to consider the laws applicable to the subject
entity in the relevant jurisdiction.
Where the operating agreement of a limited liability company does not
explicitly opt for Article 8 governance, Article 9 will apply to the member-
ship interests of a limited liability company. Article 9 covers security inter-
ests in personal property.99 Under state law, the membership interests of a
limited liability company are considered personal property.100 Similarly,
most take the position that membership interests are a species of “general
intangibles,” which are personal property governed by Article 9.
Where a party pledges personal property as security for a loan, such
security interest becomes attached to the property when it becomes en-
forceable.101 Enforceability arises when the lender disburses funds (i.e.,
transmits “value”),102 the debtor holds the right to the collateral and the
power to transfer that right to the secured party, and the debtor grants the
security interest to the secured party. This grant may be evidenced in any
of a number of ways, including the borrower signing (“authenticating”)103
a document pledging the security interest or the delivery of certificated
collateral to the secured party.104 An important issue to flag for the poten-
tial mezzanine lender with security interests governed by Article 9 is that
its security interests must be perfected according the process outlined
98. Id. at 999. Most often the Owning SPE will be incorporated as a limited liability
company (LLC), in which case its equity would not be a security under Article 8 unless it is
traded on a securities exchange, it is issued by an investment company or the limited liability
company’s operating agreement explicitly states that its equity takes the form of securities
governed by Article 8. See id. at 998; see also U.C.C. § 8-103(c) (1994).
99. U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(1) (2000).
100. See Berman, supra note 64, at 1000. See e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-702
(2012) (providing that the membership interests in a limited liability company are assignable,
a right commonly signaling a property interest).
101. U.C.C. § 9-203(a) (2000).
102. See id. § 1-201(44) (defining value):
[A] person gives ‘value’ for rights if he acquires them (a) in return for a binding commitment
to extend credit or for the extension of immediately available credit whether or not drawn
upon and whether or not a chargeback is provided for in the event of difficulties in collection;
or (b) as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a pre-existing claim; or (c) by ac-
cepting delivery pursuant to a pre-existing contract for purchase; or (d) generally, in return
for any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract.
103. See id. § 9-102(a)(7)(A).
104. See id. § 9-203(b)(3).
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above before any other lenders with security interests in the same prop-
erty if it wants to have the highest priority amongst the Owning SPE’s
creditors.105
Berman notes that many mezzanine lenders, rating agencies, and title
companies, circa 2007, began to require borrowers to certificate in regis-
tered form the pledge membership interests and expressly opt for Article 8
to govern as added protection for security interests, because the perfection
by delivery of a registered certificate under Article 8 is given higher prior-
ity in liquidation than a perfection by filing, even if the filing is done
first.106
We now turn to the relationship of the mezzanine lender and the pre-
ferred member to the Senior Lender via the inter-creditor agreement.
E. Rights vis-a-vis Other Creditors
Defaults upon the senior mortgage agreement are almost always
events of default upon the mezzanine loan or preferred equity invest-
ment.107 Conversely, defaults upon the mezzanine loan or the preferred
investment are almost never events of default under the senior mortgage
agreement.108 When the preferred member takes over management of the
Owning SPE or the mezzanine lender takes ownership of the Borrower
SPE, typically the inter-creditor agreement will require that an updated
non-consolidation opinion to be delivered.109 Non-consolidation opinions
are issued by the Owning SPE counsel and represent that in the opinion of
counsel the organizational structure of the Owning SPE (of the mezzanine
lender standing in the same position as the Owning SPE after realizing
upon its collateral) will not be consolidated with any other entity or per-
sons.110 The Senior Lender would want this opinion to ensure that finan-
cial problems of the members or affiliates of upper-level entity will not
result in the mortgaged property being subject to a bankruptcy filing.
The inter-creditor agreement may also call for the new controlling
party to grant a carve out guaranty for the senior loan.111 It may require a
105. See id. § 9-322.
106. Berman, supra note 64, at 1004. See also, U.C.C. § 8-106 (1994) (providing defini-
tion of “control” as delivery).
107. Cf. CRE FINANCE COUNCIL, INTERCREDITOR AGREEMENT 19 (1999), available at
http://www.crefc.org/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=ID&ItemID=10064 (giving right
to cure default on senior loan to mezzanine lender, the curing of which would likely not occur
without some calling of default on the mezzanine borrower, the Owning SPE) (last visited
June 29, 2012).
108. See, e.g., id. at 14-16 (Modifications, Amendments, etc. and Subordination of Mez-
zanine Loan and Mezzanine Loan Documents).
109. See generally, id. at 12-13 (Foreclosure of Separate Collateral).
110. See Gordon L. Gerson, Special-Purpose Bankruptcy Remote Entities, GERSON LAW
FIRM, 3, available at www.gersonlaw.com/images/content/specialpurpose_bankruptcyremote_
entities.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2012).
111. See CRE FINANCE COUNCIL, INTERCREDITOR AGREEMENT 13 (1999) (Foreclosure
of Collateral Subsection (A)).
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new environmental indemnity agreement and the placement of a qualified
property manager as the managing member of the Owning SPE to manage
the underlying property.112 Lastly, the inter-creditor agreement may im-
pose cash management requirements at the Borrower SPE level to ensure
that cash is not improperly diverted from the Borrower SPE to the Own-
ing SPE.113
It is important to note that while Senior Lenders have occasionally
granted inter-creditor agreements similar to mezzanine inter-creditor
agreements to preferred equity investors, the preferred equity investor
often receives much less from the Senior Lender. At a minimum, it is im-
portant that the preferred equity investor obtain an agreement from the
Senior Lender that a replacement of the Sponsor as the managing member
by preferred equity member upon a default under the operating agree-
ment will not result in a violation of the transfer restrictions under the
senior loan documents or otherwise constitute a default. In exchange for
such an agreement, the Senior Lender may require the preferred equity
investor to provide a suitable carve-out guaranty at the time of its take-
over of management of the Owning SPE. In addition, it is important that
the preferred equity investor receive notice from the Senior Lender of any
defaults or events of default.
Each of these items is provided to the mezzanine lender in the stan-
dard inter-creditor agreement (and the mezzanine lender is not always re-
quired to post a new carve-out guaranty, at least if the existing carve-out
guarantor is not removed). In addition, the inter-creditor agreement typi-
cally provides the mezzanine lender, among other things, specified cure
rights in addition to any cure rights that Borrower SPE may have. The
inter-creditor agreement may also provide the mezzanine lender with a
right to purchase the senior loan at par, and potentially without the pay-
ment of default interest, certain late fees and, sometimes, yield mainte-
nance premiums, after a senior loan event of default and before the
completion of foreclosure.114
As a matter of structural priority, any creditor of the Borrowing SPE
will take priority over the rights of either the preferred member or mezza-
nine lender. The reason for this is plain: after a takeover, the new owner of
the Borrower SPE membership interests or the new controller of the
Owning SPE will necessarily be subject to the absolute priority rule115 and
any statutory requirement to make distributions flow to creditors first
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 13-14..
115. See Mark G. Douglas, Application of the Absolute Priority Rule to Pre-Chapter 11
Plan Settlements: In Search of the Meaning of “Fair and Equitable,” JONES DAY (May/
June 2007), available at http://www.jonesday.com/newsknowledge/publicationdetail.aspx?
publication=4313 (explaining that the absolute priority rule is a creature of bankruptcy juris-
prudence and Chapter 11, but the principle exists beyond the Chapter 11 context).
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before any equity holders.116 Before any distributions can flow up to the
equity owners of the Borrower SPE, the debt at the Borrower SPE level
must be serviced.
Where preferred investments and mezzanine loans differ is at the
Owning SPE level. In terms of the ability to realize upon collateral, the
mezzanine lender will not be subject to any other creditor of the Owning
SPE assuming its security interest is perfected and its perfected interest
has priority over any other pledged membership interests.117 To the extent
that the proceeds from the UCC sale of the collateral does not cover the
total outstanding obligations under the mezzanine loan document, the sale
has the effect of eliminating all junior liens filed against the collateral,118
provided that proper notice is given to junior lienholders.119 The mezza-
nine lender’s sale of collateral at auction does nothing to alter the debts of
the Owning SPE, but those debts are irrelevant to the mezzanine lender
unless it seeks a deficiency judgment against the Owning SPE. The Own-
ing SPE is no longer part of the capital structure of the project when the
mezzanine lender takes control of the membership interests in the Bor-
rower SPE. As the new owner of the Borrower SPE, however, the mezza-
nine lender will be subject to all of the debts of the Borrower SPE and to
all liens upon the property owned by the Borrower SPE.
The preferred member, on the other hand, will remain subject to the
creditors of the Owning SPE, if any exist, because the Owning SPE re-
mains the owner of the Borrower SPE (i.e., the property owner) after the
preferred member takes over the managing member position.  In addition,
the preferred member will remain subject to and debts of the Borrower
SPE and to any liens upon the Property owned by the Borrower SPE.
There may be instances where the preferred member could challenge as
unauthorized those debts of Owning SPE or Borrower SPE that the Spon-
sor caused the Owning SPE or the Borrower SPE to incur prior to pre-
ferred equity member’s taking control of the Owning SPE without
preferred equity member’s consent, if and to the extent that such consent
was required under the Owning SPE’s operating agreement before the
change of management control.120
One issue for preferred members in attacking debts incurred or liens or
other transfers granted by an SPE under a Sponsor’s direction, where
Sponsor lacked the actual authority to cause the SPE to incur such debt or
grant such lien or other transfer, is the issue of apparent authority.121
Even though the Sponsor did not have the actual authority to cause the
116. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-804 (2012).
117. U.C.C. § 9-322 (2000).
118. See id. § 9-615(a) (2000) (providing that the application of proceeds goes first to
the administrative costs of the U.C.C. sale, then to satisfying the obligations secured by the
senior security interest, then to subordinated security interest holders).
119. See id. §9-614 (providing the information necessary for a sufficient notice).
120. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (2006).
121. See id. §2.02.
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SPE to take such action (because such action required the consent of the
preferred equity member under the terms of the applicable operating
agreement and such consent was not given), the Sponsor may have had the
apparent authority to take such action and it may have been reasonable
for third parties to rely upon the Sponsor’s representations that it did have
such authority.
The rules of thumb for the preferred member are to negotiate for
greater control of the debts that can be taken on under the limited liability
company agreement, to prevent the incurrence of unwanted debts prior to
preferred member’s taking control of Owning SPE, and to give notice to
all who may reasonably rely on the Sponsor holding himself out as an
agent of the venture after Sponsor has been replaced by preferred mem-
ber as the managing member.
One way for the preferred member to obtain some protection from
creditors who extend credit based on the apparent authority of the Spon-
sor is to have the Owning SPE’s and Borrower SPE’s articles of organiza-
tion, certificate of formation or certificate of limited partnership (that are
required to be filed with the secretary of state for the state where such
SPE is organized) expressly refer to the consent rights of the preferred
member with respect to specified major decisions. For many types of trans-
actions, such as making mortgage loans, it is standard practice for the
lender or its title company to review the organizational documents of the
borrower or grantor that are on file with the secretary of state of the state
of the entity’s formation. If such organizational documents clearly show
that the consent of the preferred member is necessary to authorized the
contemplated transaction, then it becomes more difficult for the creditor
to claim that its loan or lien is binding upon the SPE on the basis of appar-
ent authority, because it has been put on notice that Sponsor did not have
the actual authority to authorize such matter. Any such filings with the
secretary of state should be promptly updated to show the preferred eq-
uity member as the managing member upon any change in control of the
SPE, so as to put the world on notice that the preferred member and not
Sponsor is now the managing member.
While battles over whether or not a particular debt, lien or other trans-
fer was authorized by either actual or apparent authority can be difficult,
the existence of the consent right over such matters typically included
within a preferred member’s major decision rights provides a potential ad-
vantage to the preferred equity investor over the mezzanine lender. While
the mezzanine lender takes free of any liens or debts of the Owning SPE
(provided that mezzanine lender was properly perfected with first priority
in the pledged equity), it is subject to any debts or liens of Borrower SPE,
even if those were incurred or granted in violation of the terms of the
mezzanine loan documents. Although there are potentially some addi-
tional considerations (such as whether or not the preferred equity investor
benefited from the unauthorized transaction), the preferred equity inves-
tor, however, may not be subject to such burdens to the extent that it can
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show that the Sponsor had neither the actual nor the apparent authority to
authorize the loan, encumbrance, or transfer. In addition, the mere fact of
the existence of preferred equity member’s rights, may effectively prevent
the Sponsor from incurring such burdens, particularly where third parties
have notice of preferred member’s rights either as a result of the terms of
the filed organizational documents of the SPE.
Mezzanine lenders and preferred members will want to protect them-
selves from acts of the Sponsor contrary to the relationship outlined in the
operating agreement. These are generally referred to as Sponsor “bad
boy” acts.
F. Sponsor Bad Acts
Non-recourse carve-out guarantees, or “bad boy” guarantees, are a
standard requirement of CMBS mortgage loans, of mezzanine loans and
of those preferred equity investments that are the functional equivalent of
mezzanine loans (the type of preferred equity investment generally dis-
cussed in this article).122 Such guarantees are much less common and,
where they exist at all, are much more limited, in the context of those
preferred equity investments structured closer to a typical joint venture
equity investment rather than to a mezzanine loan equivalent.123 The bad
boy guarantees across the three asset classes (CMBS loans, mezzanine
loans and preferred equity) are generally, at their core, very similar. There
are some differences that are typically found, but the similarities outweigh
the differences, and we begin with them.
The guarantor’s liability under a typical non-recourse carve-out guar-
anty is bifurcated into two broad categories: (i) liability for losses suffered
by the mortgage lender, mezzanine lender or preferred equity investor
(each an “Obligee”) as a result of certain acts of borrower or its affiliates,
and (ii) liability for the entire amount of the debt (including all principal,
interests and costs) upon the occurrence of certain acts or circumstances,
regardless as to whether or not the Obligee suffers a loss as a result of such
acts or occurrences.
The first category, liability for losses, typically includes many things
that one would generally consider to be “bad acts,” including for example:
waste of the mortgaged property; fraud or material misrepresentation of
the Sponsor, borrower or guarantor; or misappropriation of rents or insur-
ance or condemnation proceeds.124 Also, often included in the “losses”
section, is a guaranty by the guarantor of all of Borrower SPE’s obliga-
122. See John C. Murray, Carveouts to Nonrecourse Loans: They Mean What They Say!
Clauses in Commercial Loan Agreements That Provide for Personal Borrower Liability Re-
ally Are Enforceable, 19 PRAC. REAL EST. L. 19 (2003) (noting that non-recourse carve-outs
have been required for mortgages since the mid-1980s).
123. The authors speculate that this may be due to lower agency costs with the more
equity-like preferred investment because the preferred member has more control and access
to information under the operating agreement.
124. See Murray, supra note 122, at 23 for a list of “bad boy” acts.
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tions under any environmental provisions of the transaction documents,
including any environmental indemnity.125 In many transactions, the guar-
antor is actually made a jointly and severally liable party to an environ-
mental indemnity126 and, in those cases, environmental liability may not
also be covered in the carve-out guaranty.
The second category, full recourse, is often referred to as “springing”
recourse.127 Events that typically spring the loan or preferred equity in-
vestment to full recourse include the voluntary bankruptcy of Borrower
SPE, or in the case of a mezzanine loan or preferred equity investment,
Owning SPE; the Borrower SPE, Owning SPE, Sponsor or, often guaran-
tor, consenting to or colluding in the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy; a
transfer of the property or of the direct or indirect equity in the Borrower
SPE in violation of the transaction documents; or a violation of the single
purpose, bankruptcy remote entity covenants (i.e., the SPE provisions) of
the Borrower SPE, or in case of a mezzanine loan or preferred equity
investment, Owning SPE.128
When negotiating a carve-out guaranty at loan closing, guarantor’s
counsel needs to pay particular attention to any provisions imposing liabil-
ity in connection with any violation of any of the SPE provisions. This
special attention is necessary because the SPE covenants are often quite
broad and may include covenants that are outside of the control of the
Sponsor, including, for example, a covenant that the SPE remain solvent.
Recently, many state courts have construed these springing recourse pro-
visions strictly, much to the chagrin of the guarantors.129 Therefore, it is
125. Id.
126. See Mark S. Dennison, Validity and Applicability of Contractual Allocations of En-
vironmental Risk, 34 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 465 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing of indemnity
agreements in the context of CERCLA litigation and the nature of environmental indemni-
ties, or “risk-shifting” contractual language).
127. See TALCOTT J. FRANKLIN, ET AL., MORTGAGE AND ASSET BACKED SECURITIES
LITIGATION HANDBOOK § 7:23 (2008) (citing to Blue Hills Office Park LLC v. J.P. Morgan
Chase Bank, 477 F. Supp. 2d 366 (D. Mass. 2007) (noting that this springing, full, recourse
carve-out was enforced). But see MICHAEL T. MADISON, ET AL., 2 LAW OF REAL ESTATE
FINANCING § 15:6 (2011) (indicating that springing guarantees are not always full recourse).
128. See 2 Law of Real Estate Financing supra note 127; see also, Wells Fargo Bank NA
v. Cherryland Mall Limited P’ship, et al., 2011 Mich. App. LEXIS 2360 (Mich. App.  2011)
(outlining SPE provisions and possible liability for their breach); CRE FINANCE COUNCIL,
MORTGAGE AND SECURITY AGREEMENT, Art. 1.1, available at https://www.crefc.org/
WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=ID&ItemID=13150.
129. See In re Wells Fargo Bank NA, 2011 Mich. App. LEXIS 2360 (holding a full re-
course carve-out enforceable against guarantor). See also, Bank of America, N.A., v. Light-
stone Holdings, LLC, 938 N.Y.S.2d 225 (N.Y. 2011) (holding $100MM carve out
enforceable); CSFB 2001- CP-4 Princeton Park Corporate Center, LLC v. SB Rental I, LLC,
410 N.J. Super. 114, 980 A.2d 1 (App. Div. 2009) (holding that carve out was not a liquidated
damages clause not an unenforceable penalty and that carve out was enforceable even after
borrower cured breach); Susan C. Tarnower, et al., Enforcement of Guarantees Securing
Commercial Real Estate Loans, PROB. & PROP. 40 (March/April 2011) (arguing that there has
been a surge recently in lenders pursuing of guarantors and that this may be due not only to
increased defaults but may also represent a new strategy for recovering on defaulted loans).
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important that a guarantor review the proposed guaranty closely with
counsel before agreeing to execute and deliver it.
Generally where there are differences between carve-out guaranties
for mezzanine loans or preferred equity transactions and those for mort-
gage loan transactions, the differences relate to the fact that the mezzanine
lender or preferred equity provider does not have a lien upon the real
estate and is in a structurally subordinate position to creditors of the Bor-
rower SPE.  So, for example, it is more typical to find in a mezzanine loan
or preferred equity carve-out guaranty than in a mortgage loan carve-out
guaranty, recourse for:
(i) any liens filed upon the property without the Obligee’s consent;
(ii) title exceptions not approved by the Obligee;
(iii) actions taken by the Sponsor, guarantor, Owning SPE or Bor-
rower SPE to impair or impede Obligee’s enforcement of it rights and
remedies under the transaction documents, and this liability some-
times is full springing recourse;
(iv) liability for violations of cash management provisions of the loan
documents; and
(v) liability for the occurrence of mortgage loan events of default that
cannot be cured by the Obligee.130
For the Obligee, the identity of the guarantor is very important. Typi-
cally the lender or investor wants the individual (a “warm body”) or indi-
viduals who have ultimate control over the Sponsor to serve as the
guarantor. In circumstances where a Sponsor is successful in negotiating
for the Obligee to accept an entity rather than an individual guaranty, the
Obligee will require that the guarantor entity have substantial net worth
and liquidity and control over the management and policies of the Spon-
sor, the Owning SPE and the Borrower SPE, as applicable.
An example of a situation where entity guarantors are fairly common
is where a substantial private equity fund is the Sponsor and its wholly
owned and controlled subsidiary is either the Sponsor member in the pre-
ferred equity joint venture, the Owning SPE or the Borrower SPE. Often,
whether the guarantor is an individual or an entity, the lender or preferred
equity investor will require net worth and liquidity covenants. While the
wherewithal to make good upon the guaranty is, of course, important, it is
essential to know that these carve-out guarantees are not credit
guarantees.
A debt service or full or partial payment guaranty is generally obtained
for credit support, and serves to protect the Obligee when the property
and its cash flow are not sufficient on a stand alone basis to satisfy the
underwriting requirements for the loan or preferred equity investment.
The carve-out guaranty, on the other hand, is primarily an in terrorem
guaranty. Its primary purpose is to ensure that the Sponsor does not per-
mit the Borrower SPE or, in the case of a mezzanine loan or preferred
130. Sample Agreements on file with Authors.
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equity investment, the Owning SPE or Sponsor member of the Owning
SPE to engage in or permit the occurrence of any “bad acts.”131
In light of these characteristics of guarantees, the lender or preferred
equity investor will want to ensure that the guarantor has control of the
Borrower SPE, the Owning SPE, in the case of a mezzanine loan, or the
Sponsor, in the case of a preferred equity investment. If more than one
individual or entity has ultimate control of the applicable entities, then
each person or entity having such control should be a guarantor. A good
rule of thumb is that (ignoring the consent required of any independent
directors) any person or entity that could cause the Borrower SPE, the
Owning SPE, in the case of a mezzanine loan, or the Sponsor, in the case
of a preferred equity investment, to file for bankruptcy should be a
guarantor.
A final key point for lenders and preferred equity investors about
carve-out guarantees is to not underestimate the importance to the trans-
action of having a strong guaranty from a credit-worthy control party. In
many instances, the only thing that prevents a Sponsor from filing the ap-
plicable of the Borrower SPE or the Owning Entity into bankruptcy to
forestall a lender’s or preferred equity investor’s exercise of its remedies is
the existence of the carve-out guaranty. While the guaranty is ultimately of
little utility if the guarantor is itself in bankruptcy or otherwise judgment-
proof, when the guarantor is solvent, the recourse carve-out guaranty is a
very powerful tool for ensuring sponsor’s cooperation when a loan or pre-
ferred equity investment goes bad.
We now turn our sights to the U.S. bankruptcy regime as it applies to
these deals, starting with a consideration of who has the ability to file for
bankruptcy in these organizational structures, followed by an analysis of
the effect of filing.
G. Bankruptcy
1. Ability to File
i. Owning SPE Filing
In a preferred equity transaction, the Sponsor member of the Owning
SPE will be the managing member or the operating partner. As such, save
for consent and approval rights negotiated for by the preferred equity in-
vestor in the operating agreement, and absent any required consent of any
independent director or manager contained in the organizational structure
due to the requirements of the Senior Lender, the Sponsor member would
have the authority to cause the Owning SPE to file for voluntary bank-
ruptcy.132 With this power, the Sponsor could also cause the Owning SPE,
131. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 3316 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a “no-contest” clause,
which is synonymous with “in terrorem” clause, as “[a] provision designed to threaten one
into action or inaction”) (alteration in original).
132. Per business organizations law, the equity holders with consent rights to bank-
ruptcy filing and the management of the filing entity control the acts of that entity. See 11
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as the sole member of Borrower SPE, to in turn cause the Borrower SPE
to file for voluntary bankruptcy.
Generally, however, in a preferred equity transaction, the operating or
limited partnership agreement will provide that the managing member or
the general partner cannot make a major decision without the prior con-
sent of the preferred equity investor, and will define any decision to file
either the Owning SPE itself or its subsidiary, the Borrower SPE into
bankruptcy as a major decision. Provided that such consent or approval
right is contained in the governing organizational document, the preferred
equity member or limited partner should be able to prevent the filing of a
voluntary bankruptcy of either SPE. If the Sponsor member goes ahead
and files one of the SPE’s into voluntary bankruptcy without such consent
or approval, then the preferred equity investor would be in a very good
position to have the filing dismissed for lack of authority or, potentially, as
a bad faith filing. Contrast this with the mezzanine lender: as a creditor to
the Owning SPE, the mezzanine lender does not have authority to initiate
a voluntary filing by the Owning SPE.133 Moreover, the mezzanine lender
is also often barred by the inter-creditor agreement from even trying to
influence the members of the Owning SPE to file voluntarily.134
In theory, the mezzanine lender could commence an involuntary bank-
ruptcy proceeding against the Owning SPE. Under Section 303 of the
Bankruptcy Code creditors may commence an involuntary bankruptcy
proceeding under Chapters 7 or 11 with respect to the entity against which
is has a claim.135 Section 330(i) permits the Bankruptcy Court to award
costs and attorney’s fees against the petitioning creditors if the involuntary
petition is dismissed. If the Bankruptcy Court finds the petition was filed
in bad faith, the Court may award compensatory or punitive damages
against the petitioning creditors.136
Where the debtor entity has fewer than twelve creditors in total, a
creditor with a claim of at least $14,425137 has standing to commence an
involuntary proceeding.138 Any mezzanine lender relevant to the current
study will satisfy this low threshold. Assuming the Owning SPE has fewer
U.S.C. § 301 (providing that any entity that qualifies as a debtor under the chapter under
which it intends to file may file), id. § 109(b) (providing that any person who is not a railroad,
insurance company, bank, among others may be a debtor under Chapter 7), id. § 109(d)
(providing that only railroads, any person that may be a debtor under Chapter 7 who is not a
stockbroker or commodities broker, and uninsured banks may be debtors under Chapter 11).
133. Cf. id.
134. See CRE FINANCE COUNCIL, INTERCREDITOR AGREEMENT 18 (1999) (providing
that the mezzanine lender shall not try to influence the Owning SPE to enter bankruptcy
voluntarily while it is still a creditor).
135. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (2010).
136. Id. § 330(i) (2010) (noting that where a creditor files in bad faith, they are liable
not only for costs and reasonable fees, but also damages).
137. Aggregate amount. If the creditor filed alongside others, all claims in the aggregate
would have to exceed this amount.
138. 11 U.S.C. § 330(b)(2) (2010).
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than twelve creditors, which is likely the case in most of these deals, the
mezzanine lender would have standing to commence an involuntary pro-
ceeding against the Owning SPE. If the Owning SPE has twelve or more
creditors, then the statute requires at least three creditors to execute the
involuntary petition.139  Only valid claims may be counted toward the in-
voluntary filing. If the claims of a petitioning creditor are subject to a bona
fide dispute, the claims cannot be counted.140
In practice, however, an inter-creditor agreement usually bars the mez-
zanine lender from forcing an involuntary bankruptcy of the Owning
SPE.141 As discussed below in the Bankruptcy Effect section, the mezza-
nine lender would not have any incentive to file an involuntary petition
under Chapter 7 or 11 at the Owning SPE level in any case because filing
would be unlikely to offer the mezzanine lender any benefit that it does
not already enjoy under the mezzanine loan agreement. The only scenario
in which the mezzanine lender might want to file is where another lender
is threatening to accelerate a loan to the Owning SPE.
ii. Borrower SPE Level
As in the Owning SPE scenario, under most operating agreements the
managing member has to gain unanimous consent of all members of the
Owning SPE to file at the Borrower SPE level. Therefore, through the
same consent rights discussed above, the preferred member can block fil-
ing. Filing would allow for the Borrower SPE to forestall the Senior
Lender’s collection efforts on the senior mortgage, although, as we will see
in the next section, the Bankruptcy Code places limitations on this protec-
tion with respect to single-asset real estate projects.
A mezzanine lender retains no control over the Borrower SPE beyond
the rights triggered by events of default. A preferred equity member is
generally similarly situated, as it is often a finance provider, and the opera-
tional and management decisions for the Owning SPE and the Borrower
SPE are generally being made by the Sponsor member, subject to the con-
sent and approval rights of the preferred member as set forth in the Own-
ing SPE’s operating agreement. Generally, each of the preferred member
and the mezzanine lender must take over control of the Borrower SPE
(the preferred member by exercising its rights to replace the Sponsor
member as the managing member of the Owning SPE with itself, and the
mezzanine lender by foreclosing upon the pledged equity in the Borrower
SPE by a UCC foreclosure sale) to gain managerial control of the Bor-
rower SPE.
One significant difference between the mezzanine lender and the pre-
ferred equity investor in this regard is that the preferred equity investor
139. Id. § 330 (b)(1).
140. Id. § 303(b)(1).
141. See CRE FINANCE COUNCIL, INTERCREDITOR AGREEMENT 18 (1999) (Rights of
Subrogation; Bankruptcy).
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will be able to seize control much more quickly because it does not need to
go through the UCC sales process. A potential snag for the preferred
member is the possibility that the Sponsor either runs into court to prevent
the takeover or becomes so uncooperative that the preferred member re-
quires judicial action to give meaning to its takeover, potentially bogging
down the takeover process in litigation. Of course, mezzanine borrowers
(the Owning SPE) can similarly attempt to use judicial intervention to pre-
vent a UCC sale as well and, as discussed below, have the trump card of
staying the sale with a voluntary bankruptcy filing.
Because neither the mezzanine lender nor the preferred member is a
creditor of the Borrower SPE, it has no ability to force an involuntary
proceeding.142
2. Bankruptcy Process and Effect; Principles of Law and Process
Upon the filing of a petition for bankruptcy and the issuance of an
order for relief at either the Owning or the Borrower SPE level, the auto-
matic stay takes effect, preventing the commencement of collection ef-
forts, or continuing collection efforts, on any indebtedness against the filed
entity.143 After filing, the SPE will be allowed to continue operating “in
ordinary course.”144 The property of the bankrupt entity existing prior to
the filing of the petition becomes property of the bankruptcy estate,145 as
well as any proceeds, rents or profits from such property.146 Under Chap-
ter 11, the SPE would then submit a reorganization plan, which, as an
adequate means for the execution of that plan, can include the retention
by the entity of any or all of the property of the estate.147 Thus, the SPE
under a reorganization would then become a Debtor-in-Possession
(“DIP”), which transforms the SPE into an operating entity that manages
the estate property (with managing member in control per company
form), much like the trustee-in-bankruptcy in the Chapter 7 liquidation
context.148
Through the DIP financing power, the SPE could seek out additional
funding. Acting as a trustee, the DIP may access credit to finance the short
term operations of the project while it devises a reorganization plan.149
Understanding that creditors may reasonably withhold extension of credit
to bankrupted entities, the Code provides carrots to induce creditors to
provide financing. For instance, the DIP lender may be given priority over
142. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2010) (providing that to have standing to file, an entity must be
a “holder of a claim” against the person it seeks to force to file).
143. Id. § 362(a)(1).
144. Id. § 362(c).
145. Id. § 541.
146. Id. § 541(a)(6).
147. Id. § 1123(a)(5)(A).
148. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS 396 (6th ed. 2011).
149. See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2010).
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all administrative and unsecured claims because the court can order that
the DIP financing be given priority over the administrative expenses of the
estate.150  Under narrow circumstances, the Bankruptcy Court has author-
ity to order that the DIP financing be senior to or pari passu with the pre-
petition secured creditor liens.151
Only impaired creditors vote on the plan proposed by the DIP.152 All
creditor claims against the bankruptcy estate are deemed “impaired” un-
less the DIP leaves the legal and equitable rights of the claimant unaltered
(or unaccounted for in its reorganization plan) or the debtor cures the
default, reinstates the maturity of the claim, compensates the claimant for
any damages derived from reasonable reliance on the contract terms with-
out otherwise altering the legal or equitable rights of such creditor.153
Every class of impaired claimants in a class must accept the reorganiza-
tion plan so long as at least one half of the total number of creditors in the
class approve the plan and their claims total at least two thirds in amount
of indebtedness of the class.154 The Bankruptcy Court will confirm the
plan as long as the claimants of any class will receive at least as much as
they would under a Chapter 7 liquidation,155 at least one class of impaired
creditors vote to accept the plan,156 and the court determines that the plan
is feasible.157 Upon confirmation of the plan, all debts not accounted for in
the plan are discharged.158
Congress has enacted a number of provisions related to single asset
real estate (“SARE”)— debtors who receive substantially all of their gross
income comes from a single property or project.159 Over the last sixty
years, most SARE Chapter 11 filings were the result of over-leveraged
real estate projects that experienced a decline in rents,  which the debtor
depended on to service its debt.160
150. Id. § 364(c)(1).
151. Id. § 364(d)(1) (providing that the trustee or DIP may only do so if the primed lien
holder is adequately protected).
152. David Gray Carlson, Rake’s Progress: Cure and Reinstatement of Secured Claims in
Bankruptcy Reorganization, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 273, 283 (1997). See also S. REP. NO. 95-989,
120 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5906 (“[T]he holder of a claim or interest
who under the plan is restored to his original position, when others receive less or get nothing
at all, is fortunate indeed and has no cause to complain.”) (alteration in original).
153. 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1), (2)(A)-(C), (E) (2010).
154. Id. § 1126(c)-(d).
155. Id. a§ 1129(a)(7).
156. Id. § 1129(a)(10).
157. Id. § 1129(a)(11).
158. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 148, at 397.
159. 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B) (2010) (providing a definition of SARE).
160. Kenneth N. Klee, One Size Fits Some: Single Asset Real Estate Cases, 87 CORNELL
L. REV. 1285, 1294 (2002).
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Since 2001,161 the Bankruptcy Code has included special provisions for
all SARE Chapter 11 filings that will allow for relief from the automatic
stay in favor of a claimant on an expedited basis. Under Section 362(d)(3),
a senior mortgagee will be granted relief from the automatic stay unless
the debtor files a plan that is likely to be confirmed within 90 days of filing
for bankruptcy relief, or has begun to make mortgage interest payments to
the mortgagee according to contract terms.162 Scholars have put forth
many arguments to justify these limitations,163 but Congress’ putative aim
was to prevent equity holders from hiding the collateral they pledged be-
hind the shield of the automatic stay in hopes that their property might
regain value through an uptick in the market.164
Warren and Westbrook note that filing for Chapter 11 is an invitation
to a formalized negotiation.165 They argue that Chapter 11 allows the
debtor to have bargaining power that it would not otherwise have in a
private negotiation where the lenders’ rights under the loan documents
would place the lenders in a superior position.166 Bankruptcy, at least tem-
porarily, gives the debtor greater bargaining power, which helps to explain
the emphasis by mezzanine lenders and preferred equity investors on
carve-out guarantees and single purpose, bankruptcy remote entity provi-
sions in an attempt to minimize the risk that an SPE will be able to file for
bankruptcy or, once in bankruptcy, to retain the property or collateral in
the bankruptcy estate.167
161. See id. at 1293 (noting that under the 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code,
SARE limitation applied only to cases with a value of less than $4 million, but that in 2001,
Congress repealed the cap.)
162. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) (2010).
163. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making,
17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 356, 371 (2001) (arguing for allowing state foreclosure law to govern
SARE’s because allowing SARE’s to file Chapter 11 prevents the efficient allocation of the
resources tied up in failing projects); Daniel C. Draper, Stays of Mortgage Foreclosure—A
Proposal for Reform, 93 BANKING L.J. 133, 135-36 (1976) (arguing that the common pool
problem, where one creditor forecloses on its security interest to the detriment of all other
creditors, which is generally mitigated by reorganization, is usually absent from the SARE
context because of the low number of creditors involved in the deals).
164. See Klee, supra note 160, at 1292 (citing “[t]he problem with single asset cases is
that there is usually not reasonable prospect of reorganization. The bankruptcy filing is sim-
ply used as a legal method to delay foreclosure.”) (citing COMMERCIAL AND CREDIT ISSUES
IN BANKRUPTCY: HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON COURTS & ADMIN. PRACTICE OF
THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 102D CONG. 89 (1991) (statement of Mary Jane
Flaherty) (alteration in original)). See also In re JER/ Jameson Mezz Borrower II, LLC, 461
B.R. 293 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (dismissing a bankruptcy petition by SARE company for bad
faith when filed on the eve of foreclosure).
165. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 148, at 398.
166. See id. (noting that it affords the debtor: (1) the possibility of adopting a plan that
legally binds all creditors, even if a minority rejects it; (2) six months or more with the exclu-
sive right to propose a plan; (3) the turnover or avoidance powers that increase the assets
available to turnaround the business and provides powerful leverage over otherwise poten-
tially over powering creditors whose rights under contract are considerably in their favor).
167. Id. at 399.
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3. Owning SPE Filing
The members of the Owning SPE will only file to protect against the
acceleration of any debt held at the Owning SPE level. Where the
threatened acceleration exists at the Borrower SPE level, filing at the
Owning SPE level will do nothing to protect the revenue-producing asset
property. While the Owning SPE would benefit from the automatic stay
upon its creditors, the lifeblood of the project, the cash flows from the
underlying property, would not be protected from foreclosure on the
mortgage at the Borrower SPE level.
If the senior loan cannot be cured within the cure period defined by
the contract, the Senior Lender will be entitled to foreclose on the prop-
erty and the Borrower SPE will, in most states, have to fulfill all of its
obligations under the senior mortgage document prior to the foreclosure
sale in order to redeem its interest in the property.168 The automatic stay
at the Owning SPE level in the scenario where the Borrower SPE defaults
would not protect the profit-producing source, the underlying asset prop-
erty, because the property is not an asset of the debtor, the Owning SPE,
but of its subsidiary, the Borrower SPE. In order to forestall the Senior
Lender from exercising its remedies against the property, the members of
the Owning SPE would need to cause the SPE Owning Entity, as the sole
member of the Borrower SPE, to in turn cause the Borrower SPE to file
for voluntary bankruptcy, which would stay any collection efforts of the
senior lender on the Borrower SPE.169
Keep in mind that filing at the Owning SPE level will not protect any
carve-out guarantor against any guarantor liability that the lender or pre-
ferred equity member may have against the guarantor. In order to gain
such protection, the guarantor would have to file for bankruptcy itself.
The remainder of this section will contemplate a scenario where the
members of the Owning SPE, file as a protective measure against accelera-
tion under a mezzanine loan at the Owning SPE level.
After filing, through the automatic stay and the increased bargaining
power and the protections under the Bankruptcy Code, the Owning SPE
gains breathing room to attempt to reorganize its operations. Assuming
there is sufficient equity in the project to provide the necessary incentives
to compel their activities, the equity holders of the Owning SPE may well
undertake the endeavor notwithstanding any carve-out guaranty exposure
to its principals.
Where the mezzanine lender has perfected its security interest in the
shares of the Owning SPE,170 the mezzanine lender would be secured to
the extent of the value of its interest in the pledged equity in Borrower
168. See supra Section II.A for a general survey of the requirements to redeem a fore-
closed property.
169. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2010).
170. See supra Section II.D for a discussion of perfecting security interests in the Bor-
rower SPE membership interests.
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SPE.171 If the source of the inability to service the mezzanine debt derives
from problems with the cash flows from the underlying property, it is un-
likely that the membership interests in the Borrower SPE would fully se-
cure the mezzanine lender’s claim. While any increase in value during the
pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding would accrue to the benefit of the
mezzanine lender,172 if the underlying asset property is not performing
well, the membership interests may be of a lesser value than the mezza-
nine lender’s allowed secured claim. The amount of its total claim (the
amount of debt outstanding) less the value of its security interest would be
unsecured.173
The valuation of collateral is to be determined “in light of the purpose
of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of the prop-
erty”.174 While in the consumer bankruptcy context, this valuation is de-
termined by the replacement value (the cost of replacement on the retail
market),175 in the business context there is no statutory guidance. How-
ever the valuation of collateral is ultimately determined, there is a reason-
able likelihood that the value of the pledged equity in the Borrower SPE
will be less than the amount outstanding under the mezzanine loan, and, in
such a case, the mezzanine lender would be undersecured.
The mezzanine lender will often seek relief from the automatic stay
from the bankruptcy court. If such relief were granted, the mezzanine
lender would be free to proceed with a UCC foreclosure sale upon the
pledged equity in Borrower SPE. If the interests of the secured creditor
are adequately protected, and provided that no other basis for stay relief
exists under Section 362, relief from the automatic stay will not be or-
dered.176 Although Section 361 of the Bankruptcy Code does not define
the phrase adequate protection, Section 362 offers three ways to effectuate
adequate protection: (1) through periodic payments to the secured credi-
tor, (2) through an additional or replacement lien, or (3) through other
means “as will result in the realization by such entity of the indubitable
171. 11 U.S.C. § 506 (a)(1) (2010).
172. But see Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992) (holding that “§ 506(d) does
not allow petitioner to “strip down” respondents’ lien, because respondents’ claim is secured
by a lien and has been fully allowed pursuant to § 502.”). This case stands for the principle
that a mortgagor may not strip the value of a junior mortgagee’s security interest in the
subject property to the judicially determined value of the collateral and that, therefore, the
lien “passes through bankruptcy unaffected.” Id. at 417. See also In re Machinery, Inc., 287
B.R. 755 (applying the policy principle of Dewsnup to security interests in the cash proceeds
from aerial lifts, which are governed by Article 9 of the UCC, stating that the Dewsnup
holding was “premised . . . in part on a policy principle that any increase in the value of
collateral during the pendency of the bankruptcy accrues to the secured creditor . . . [and]
should not be judicially frozen at some particular point in time . . . .”) (alteration in original).
173. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2010).
174. Id.
175. Id. § 506(a)(2).
176. Id. § 362(d).
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equivalent of such entity’s interest in such property.”177 Therefore, as a
secured creditor, the mezzanine lender would be entitled to adequate pro-
tection through one of these methods for the amount of its allowed se-
cured claim.
In a Chapter 7 liquidation scenario, the mezzanine lender would be
entitled to recoup the total amount obtained through the sale of the collat-
eral by the trustee up to the value of its interest in the property.178 To the
extent that the value obtained through such sale was less than the value of
the mezzanine lender’s claim, the remaining difference of the mezzanine
loan would be considered an unsecured claim,179 and would be subject to
the pro rata distribution of remaining cash obtained through liquidation of
the Owning SPE’s other assets after secured claims and unsecured claims
of greater priority are satisfied.180 Because the only assets of the Owning
SPE are the Borrower SPE membership interests, this distribution would
likely be zero. Following the distribution of the liquidated assets, the re-
maining amount of the mezzanine lender’s interest would not be dis-
charged under Chapter 7.181 This will likely spell the end for the
bankrupted entity, thus foreclosing any opportunity to recoup on any of
the remaining interest because the Owning SPE would likely not have
money to pay the non-discharged debt.
Theoretically, the net effect of a Chapter 7 filing at the Owning SPE
level for the mezzanine lender would not produce an outcome differing
from what is already available through the recourse provided for under
the loan document. As noted before, the mezzanine lender can seize the
collateral shares in the event of default and put them up for UCC sale. If
the trustee of the bankruptcy estate seized the property, the proceeds of
the sale of the collateral would go to the mezzanine lender up to the value
of the mezzanine lender’s allowed secured claim. In fact, under such cir-
cumstances, the trustee may abandon the property or consent to the relief
of stay to allow the secured lender to liquidate the collateral outside of the
bankruptcy.182 Such action would leave the mezzanine lender’s security
interest in the collateral untouched and have no impact on the mezzanine
lender’s lien, leaving the mezzanine lender in the position it was in before
the filing.  Whether or not the process would work out as favorably for the
177. Id. § 361(1)-(3). For a discussion of adequate protection, see In re Rogers Develop-
ment Corp., 2 B.R. 679, 680 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
178. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2010).
179. Id.
180. 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (2010).
181. See 11. U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (2010) (providing that the debtor in Chapter 7 after
liquidation and distribution will be discharged of debt unless it is not an individual); Cf. 11
U.S.C. § 101(9) (2010) (providing that a corporation is an association having power or privi-
lege that a private corporation, but not an individual . . . possesses . . .”) (emphasis added);
see also Warren, supra note 148, at 397.
182. See 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2010) (giving the trustee the power, after notice and hear-
ing, to abandon property of the estate that is of “inconsequential value and benefit to the
estate.”).
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mezzanine lender, the mezzanine lender would prefer to avoid the costs
and delays of a bankruptcy of its borrower (the Owning SPE).
In the context of a UCC sale conducted by the mezzanine lender, no
third party trustee would impose any hindrances on a sale conducted in
compliance with the requirements of the UCC, but otherwise according to
the mezzanine lender’s desires. In a scenario where the mezzanine loan is
in default and the mezzanine lender is not being paid the amounts due to it
under the mezzanine loan documents, at least with a UCC sale, control of
the process is in the mezzanine lender’s hands. In light of a mezzanine
lender’s preference to control the process, the mezzanine lender will gen-
erally move to accomplish a sale as quickly as possible while still being
commercially reasonable, with the goal of completing the sale before the
Sponsor files the Owning SPE into bankruptcy.
Note that once the Sponsor makes up its mind to file, filing can be
done almost immediately. This deserves more attention because it speaks
to the mezzanine lender’s motivations in general. The mezzanine lender
does not want the Owning SPE to file for bankruptcy, because the bank-
ruptcy process can be unpredictable, other than with respect to the fact
that it will lead to additional costs and delay for the mezzanine lender.
Once the situation has deteriorated to the point where the mezzanine
lender is exercising remedies, what the mezzanine lender wants is to gain
control of the Borrower SPE (and therefore the mortgaged property) so
that it can try to rectify whatever operating problems exist at the property,
gain control of any property cash flow excess after senior loan payments
and, either promptly or after some period of repair and releasing, market
the property for sale.
If the mezzanine lender believes that the Sponsor is not a source of the
property’s problems and if the Sponsor is cooperating with the mezzanine
lender, then the mezzanine lender and the Sponsor would enter into a
work-out and the mezzanine lender would not need to exercise its reme-
dies and the Owning SPE would not need to file for bankruptcy. While
there are certainly disagreements between mezzanine lenders and Spon-
sors as to whether or not the best course of action is a restructuring, in the
mezzanine lender’s view, if restructuring were the best option, it would
have taken it consensually and through private action. A mezzanine lender
does not want to have a restructuring forced upon it by the bankruptcy
process.
Under the DIP financing power, the Owning SPE could seek addi-
tional funding from creditors.183 This power is reason for concern for the
mezzanine lender. The only assets owned by the Owning SPE are the Bor-
rower SPE membership interests, all of which have already been pledged
to the mezzanine lender as a security interest for the loan it gave to the
Owning SPE. Unless the DIP can convince a new creditor to give a loan in
exchange for priority as an administrative expense of the estate under
183. 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2010).
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§ 364(a) or (b), or with a junior lien on the Borrower SPE membership
interests under § 364(c), then the only other option would be to prime the
lien the mezzanine lender has on the Borrower SPE membership inter-
ests.184 While the mezzanine lender would be protected by the court ap-
proval required and the requirement of adequate protection, being subject
to a prior or pari passu lien on the pledged collateral is not what the mez-
zanine lender bargained for. The good news for the mezzanine lender is
that such a priming or pari passu lien is only allowable under very narrow
circumstances.
While such a situation is theoretically possible, under the standard sin-
gle purpose, bankruptcy remote entity structure of mezzanine loans, it is
very unlikely. There simply would not be any way for the DIP to provide
the mezzanine lender with adequate protection for the repayment of its
debt, because the Owning SPE has no assets other than the pledged collat-
eral. If the pledged collateral had sufficient value above the mezzanine
loan amount to allow for senior DIP financing, it is difficult to see many
circumstances where the bankruptcy would be necessary.
If the members of the Owning SPE file for bankruptcy before the mez-
zanine lender completes the UCC sale, the mezzanine lender would have
the right to object to any proposed Chapter 11 reorganization plan.185 In a
simpler capital structure where there are no other creditors to the Owning
SPE, the mezzanine lender would be the necessary vote to get to either the
two thirds total claim amount or one half total number of creditors needed
for the plan to be considered for certification by a court.186 Even in a
scenario where there are many creditors at the Owning SPE level, giving
the mezzanine lender insufficient voting power to block the plan, the
Bankruptcy Code gives the mezzanine lender the baseline protection that
the plan must provide for the mezzanine lender to at least recoup what it
would under Chapter 7.187
The mezzanine lender is given another tool to protect itself under
§ 1111(b). The lender’s interest, under the § 1111(b) election, could be
protected to the full extent of the face value of the loan.188 According to
Warren and Westbrook, this provision is used most often in the SARE
184. Id. § 364(a)-(d).
185. 11 U.S.C. § 1128(b) (2010) (providing that any party in interest may object to the
proposed plan at the confirmation hearing). See also 11 U.S.C. 1126(a) (2010) (providing that
a holder of a claim may accept or reject a plan). The combination of these provisions gives
the holder of a claim a stronger negotiating position with respect to the contents of the plan.
With respect to the subject deals of this study, a mezzanine lender, or a preferred member
with accrued dividends putting it in the position of a creditor, the small number of creditors
to the Owning SPE would give them more bargaining power than a creditor in the context of
a large corporate reorganization with many creditors would have. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 18-606(1)(b) (2012) (providing that a member of a limited liability company that becomes
entitled to receive a distribution has the status of a creditor).
186. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (c)-(d) (2010).
187. Id. § 1129(a)(7).
188. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 148, at 677.
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context and primarily benefits under-secured creditors under § 506(a).189
Under § 1111(b), both recourse and non-recourse lenders may, prior to
the conclusion of the disclosure statement hearing, elect to waive the un-
secured portion of their allowed claim under § 506(a).190 When the lender
so elects, the debtor is required to pay the total dollar amount the creditor
is owed under the promissory note. That is, the total nominal amount of
the note is allowed as a secured claim.191 The debtor must pay the total
present value of the claim up to the value of the collateral and any remain-
der  must be paid at the nominal value.192
Where the secured creditor makes the § 1111(b) election, the debtor
must satisfy a two-part payment test under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II).193 First,
the debtor must pay cash payments “totaling at least the allowed amount
of such claim . . . .”194  Second, the payments must be “of a value, as of the
effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder’s interest in
the estate’s interest in such property.”195 This test is structured not as two
separate amounts that must be paid, but as two components of a test that
must be satisfied by the debtor’s payment plan.196 The first part refers to
the total nominal claim.197 The second part refers to the value of the se-
curity interest, which is allowed at a value adjusted by a present value
calculation.198
To illustrate the operation of these provisions, consider the follow-
ing.199A mezzanine lender makes a $1,000,000 loan to the Owning SPE.
The Owning SPE pledges all the shares of the Borrower SPE as collateral
for the loan. When the Owning SPE files for Chapter 11, the value of the
pledged equity is only $500,000. Therefore, under § 506(a), the total se-
cured portion of the allowed claim would be $500,000, and the unsecured
portion of the claim would be $500,000. Assuming a plan that called for all
payments to be made within one year with a rate of interest at 10% (to
account for present value), then at the end of the year, the mezzanine
lender would receive $550,000. Assuming that the unsecured claims are
receiving a pro-rata distribution at 20 cents on the dollar, the mezzanine
lender would receive an additional $100,000, bringing the total to $650,000.
Where the mezzanine lender makes an § 1111(b) election, the total
value of its allowed secured claim would be $1,000,000. Assume the debtor
189. Id.
190. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(1)(B) (2010).
191. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 148, at 678.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2010).
195. Id.
196. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 148, at 678.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Modeled after the hypothetical provided in WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note
148, at 678-79.
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has submitted and the court has confirmed a plan that lasts one year. If the
lender receives payment for that total by the end of the year, both ele-
ments of the two-part test would be satisfied. It would receive “at least the
. . . amount of . . . [the allowed] claim” as well as an amount “at least the
[present] value of [its] interest in the estate’s interest in such property,”200
which is the value of the collateral at the time of the effectiveness of the
plan, i.e. $500,000 plus $50,000 interest.
In the case of a quick repayment schedule like this, the mezzanine
lender makes out better than it would without making the § 1111(b) elec-
tion.201 Contrast this with a longer term plan: If the plan were ten years
long, the creditor would lose out by not opting for the $650,000 available
without the § 1111(b) election.202 Assuming a discount rate of 10% and
$100,000 payments per year for ten years, the present value of such an
annuity would be just under $615,000. Therefore, the mezzanine lender
would be better off not making the § 1111(b) election in this scenario.
Only impaired creditors may be included in creditor classes with the
power to vote for or against a reorganization plan.203 By making the
§ 1111(b) election, the mezzanine lender would no longer be impaired be-
cause its claim would be equal to the amount it was due under the original
mezzanine loan agreement. Therefore, the mezzanine lender would not be
able to vote for or against the plan because its claim has not been im-
paired. Creditors will often seek an indication of the terms of the plan the
debtor intends to propose in order to maximize value through the choice
of whether to make the 1111(b) election. The debtor may have something
to gain out of withholding such information, as outlined in the ten year
plan hypothetical above. Therefore, there is a potential for litigation costs
preceding the election where the parties refuse to cooperate.204
With respect to the ultimate effect of bankruptcy, the Owning SPE
members almost certainly have more to gain than the mezzanine lender.
While the mezzanine lender would stand before the members in the event
of liquidation, in the event of a confirmed reorganization plan all lenders
are bound to honor the plan.205 Thus, even in the scenario where the prop-
erty makes a phenomenal turnaround and the debtor could have repaid all
of the debt, the debtor is only required to pay the amount outlined in the
reorganization plan, which could produce a windfall for the equity mem-
bers retained by the plan206 who benefit from the breathing room of the
automatic stay and the discharge of any debt not included in the plan.207
200. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2010) (alteration in original).
201. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 148, at 679.
202. Id.
203. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (2010).
204. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 148, at 681.
205. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (2010).
206. See id. § 1141(d)(2) (providing that equity holders may be terminated by the plan
in addition to the discharge of debts not included in the plan).
207. Id. § 1141(d)(1)(A).
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4. Filing at Borrowing SPE Level
Where the cash flows of the underlying asset property are insufficient
to service the senior debt, the members of the Owning SPE or the mezza-
nine lender (after having taken ownership of the Borrower SPE member-
ship interests through the UCC sale) may seek to file at the Borrowing
SPE level.
The applicable legal principles and process would generally be the
same as outlined above. At filing, the automatic stay would attach,
preventing the Senior Lender from pursuing any collection activities
against the Borrower SPE. The automatic stay would give the controlling
party of the Borrower SPE breathing room to step back and come up with
a reorganization plan. The Senior Lender’s allowed secured claim under
506(a) would be equal to the value of the underlying property and any
remaining value of the outstanding loan balance exceeding the value of
the property would be considered unsecured. The valuation of the prop-
erty would turn on the “intended disposition or use” which could cut in
favor of using liquidation value because if the debtor does not redeem, the
inevitable disposition would be foreclosure. The SARE provisions will ap-
ply here and so the Borrower SPE will, within 90 days of filing, have to
either commence making regular payments under the contract terms or
submit a plan with a reasonable likelihood of being confirmed.
The DIP in this scenario would be controlled by the managing member
of the Owning SPE, per company form. The Owning SPE owns all of the
membership interests in the Borrower SPE, and the Owning SPE is the
manager of the Borrower SPE. Therefore, the manager of the Owning
SPE would, via the organizational structure, manage the Borrower SPE
and therefore the estate. Of course, if the mezzanine lender has foreclosed
upon the equity in the Borrower SPE before the filing, then the DIP
would be controlled by the mezzanine lender. The DIP financing power is
a function that could prove efficacious. With it the members of the Own-
ing SPE could, if no other creditors could be convinced to provide financ-
ing at a lower level priority, prime any existing creditor’s lien on the
Borrower SPE assets. Therefore, the Borrower SPE could, in theory, ob-
tain a new senior loan with more favorable terms and prime the lien on the
old senior loan. Given the general suspicion Congress has expressed
through the SARE provisions, however, it is unlikely that a bankruptcy
court would allow such action.
Of course, if the mezzanine lender has foreclosed upon the equity in
the Borrower SPE before the filing, then the DIP would be controlled by
the mezzanine lender208 and, similarly, if the preferred equity member had
replaced or thereafter replaces the Sponsor with itself as the managing
member or general partner of the Owning SPE, then the preferred mem-
ber will control the DIP.
208. Note that the mezzanine lender is stepping into the place where the Owning SPE
previously stood by foreclosing on the membership interests of the Borrower SPE.
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The Senior Lender will have the option of making the § 1111(b) elec-
tion, but the cost-benefit analysis to motivate that choice would again turn
on the length of the reorganization plan. If the Senior Lender opts for
§ 1111(b), then it will not be able to vote on the plan. So long as the pay-
ment test under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) is met, along with the other ele-
ments of § 1129, the plan will be confirmed. If the Senior Lender does not
opt for the § 1111(b) election, it may still wield its vote against the confir-
mation of the plan, which would likely be a fatal blow against confirmation
because the Borrower SPE is unlikely to have any other significant
creditors.
As noted in the Sponsor Bad Acts section, there may be guarantees
that are triggered by the voluntary filing of the Borrower SPE providing
for liability of the Sponsor for the total outstanding senior debt upon the
filing. One important practice point, if mezzanine lender has foreclosed,
then the carve-out guarantor affiliated with the Sponsor may find itself in
a situation where it no longer has any control over the actions of the Bor-
rower SPE (including, whether or not it will file for bankruptcy) but is
nevertheless liable for its “bad acts” under the carve-out guaranty that it
gave to the Senior Lender. While this situation provides the maximum
flexibility for the mezzanine lender, as the entity controlling the Borrower
SPE, in its negotiations with the Senior Lender, it is a bad result for both
the carve-out guarantor, who becomes exposed to liability not of its mak-
ing. Similarly, the Senior Lender will be worse off because it no longer has
the benefit of the in terrorem effect of the guaranty. Counsel for the guar-
antor and the Senior Lender should address this issue in the negotiation of
the loan documents and inter-creditor agreement prior to loan closing.
5. Sponsor Filing
The Sponsor may file for bankruptcy in an attempt to hide behind the
automatic stay to prevent its replacement as managing member of the
Owning SPE to the preferred member or to pay on any guaranty under
the senior mortgage or the mezzanine loan. In this case, the mezzanine
lender, or any other creditor of the Owning or Borrower SPE would not
be stayed from collection actions against the Owning or Borrower SPE
because neither the Owning nor the Borrower SPE has filed. They would,
however, be stayed from any collection efforts upon the Sponsor under
any guarantees.
The story is different with respect to the preferred member seeking to
obtain control of the Owning SPE. While the Sponsor would argue other-
wise, the preferred member may not necessarily be stayed from wresting
control of the Owning SPE from the Sponsor. The preferred member
could argue that the Sponsor as managing member acts as a fiduciary for
the Owning SPE and therefore his role is a “power that the debtor may
exercise solely for the benefit of another entity other than the debtor . . . ”
which is explicitly excluded from the Sponsor’s estate and thus not able to
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benefit from the protection of the automatic stay.209 Moreover, if the filing
was solely a litigation tactic to avoid the transfer of control, the preferred
member would have an argument that the filing was made in bad faith.210
Finally, the argument against the Sponsor’s position could be further
bolstered by state law. Under the Delaware Limited Liability Company
Act (hereinafter DE LLC Act), where a member of a limited liability com-
pany files for voluntary bankruptcy, unless otherwise provided for in the
operating agreement, its membership in the limited liability company is
terminated by operation of law.211 Most other jurisdictions take the same
position.212 Therefore, the Sponsor would no longer be a member of the
Owning SPE limited liability company after filing for bankruptcy and so as
a matter of law the Sponsor’s position is no longer protected because its
rights to participate in management cease with the termination of its mem-
bership. As such, the Sponsor’s assertion of intrusion upon the automatic
stay would fail on these grounds as well.
The authors find the preferred member’s arguments persuasive, but
note that the Bankruptcy Code’s provisions for voiding ipso facto provi-
sions in contracts may present an issue for the preferred member’s case.
An ipso facto provision is a contractual provision that terminates an exec-
utory contract as a result of a bankruptcy filing or financial condition.213
Such provisions are generally unenforceable.214 These provisions most
often effectuate a termination of rights and obligations automatically upon
a bankruptcy filing and,215 in the scenario governed by provisions like the
one we are discussing, the effect is a change in management control of the
Owning SPE triggered by a bankruptcy filing. Courts that have considered
the enforceability of a provision in an operating agreement or limited part-
nership agreement that upon bankruptcy the manager or general party
ceases to have the power to manage the limited liability company or the
limited partnership are split.216
209. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(1) (2010). This argument assumes that fiduciary duties have not
been contracted away. See supra, Section II.H, for a discussion of fiduciary duties under
Delaware Limited Liability Company Law.
210. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2010).
211. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-304(1)(b) (2012).
212. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 608.4237(1)(b) (2000).
213. See 9C AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 2345 (2012).
214. Id.
215. See id. at n. 1, for cases where the provision in question provided for termination
(citing In re Margulis, 323 B.R. 130 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Maxon Engineering Ser-
vices, Inc., 324 B.R. 429 (Bankr. D. P.R. 2005); In re Woskob, 305 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2002); In
re Compass Van & Storage Corp., 65 B.R. 1007 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986)).
216. See, e.g., In re Deluca, 194 B.R. 65 (Bankr. E.D. Va.1996) (holding that a Virginia
limited liability company’s operating agreement, which provided for the dissolution of the
company upon a member’s bankruptcy filing, with the remaining members having the right to
elect to continue the business and to elect a new manager, fell with the exception of 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(e)(2) and accordingly are not invalid ipso facto provisions under § 365(e)(1)). See also,
Milford Power Co., LLC v. PDC Milford Power, LLC, 866 A.2d 738, 761 (Del. Ch. 2004)
(noting that “[i]n the case of an LP or LLC agreement that makes the debtor-partner or
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6. Filing at the Owning SPE Level, Change of Control, and the
Automatic Stay
We now turn to the issue of the preferred member taking control of the
Owning SPE by wresting the position of managing member from the
Sponsor where the Sponsor has not filed but the Owning SPE has. If the
operating agreement requires the removal of the Sponsor from the manag-
ing member position upon filing, replaced by the preferred member,
would the preferred member’s act of taking control violate the automatic
stay? While there is some language under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) forbidding
“any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from
the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate,”217 the authors
view it as unlikely that change of control would violate the stay. The man-
agement rights are the rights of the Sponsor and not of the Owning SPE.
The situation is analogous to a situation where an entity files bankruptcy
and a pledgee of the equity in the entity exercises its rights to realize upon
the pledged equity. In both situations the property of the debtor is not
subject to the enforcement action and the stay should not be considered
violated.
In any event, this issue generally does not arise in the preferred equity
context, because the preferred equity agreement between the Sponsor
member and the preferred equity member almost always requires that the
Owning SPE may not file for bankruptcy without the prior consent of the
preferred equity member. If the preferred equity document so provides,
then the Sponsor member would not have authority to itself cause the
filing and any filing effected by the Sponsor member without the preferred
member’s consent, would be subject to dismissal both on grounds of being
an unauthorized filing and as bad faith.
Members of the Owning SPE may seek to stay the mezzanine lender
from collection efforts through filing for bankruptcy. Filing would stay any
collection action, including foreclosure on the collateral and the UCC sale.
Contemplating this danger, the mezzanine lender will often seek provi-
sions that make the guarantor of the mezzanine loan, often the Sponsor,
member a key part of the entity’s management on a going-forward basis, there is . . . a strong
argument that [11 U.S.C. §§ 365(e)(2) and 365(c)(1), which make personal service contracts
unassumable,] preclude a Bankruptcy Trustee from assuming at least those aspects of the
contract granting the debtor managerial rights. . . .”) (alteration in original); cf. In Re Garri-
son-Ashburn, LLC, 235 B.R. 700, 708 (E.D. Va. 2000) (holding that where a limited liability
company’s operating agreement “merely provides the structure for the management of the
company”, it is not an executory contract and therefore unassumable); but cf., Summit Inv. &
Development Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608, 609 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(e) preempts certain provisions in a limited partnership agreement and the Massachu-
setts Limited Partnership Act which each purport to convert the general partnership interests
held by general partners into limited partnership interests immediately upon its filing of a
Chapter 11 petition); In re Clinton Court, 160 B.R. 57, 60 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding
partnership agreements are executory contracts which cannot be affected by ipso facto
clauses found in state statutes).
217. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (2010) (emphasis added).
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liable for the total outstanding principal and interest upon voluntary bank-
ruptcy filing of the Owning SPE. This recourse will generally provide suffi-
cient incentive to dissuade the Sponsor from a voluntary filing.
The guarantor/Sponsor may be willing to risk being sued in this scena-
rio and litigate out the conflict, in which case the mezzanine lender will
have to determine if such litigation is a positive net present value en-
deavor. The guarantor may try to argue that it did not have ultimate deci-
sional authority over the filing, although unless the action of the guarantor
itself was required under the terms of the guaranty to trigger recourse, this
is unlikely to be a good defense. Of course, if the guarantor is judgment-
proof, the mezzanine lender’s recourse to the guarantor would be largely
meaningless.
When the preferred member successfully takes over the management
of the Owning SPE, it must consider what duties attach with the assump-
tion of control. In the next section, we consider the law on default fiduci-
ary duties managers of limited liability companies owe to other members.
H. Preferred Member Fiduciary Duties
While the preferred member will not be burdened by the same proce-
dural and substantive limitations to its remedies that the mezzanine
lender218 will be, the preferred member could owe fiduciary duties to the
Sponsor and any other members of the Owning SPE when the preferred
member takes over as managing member.219 The Delaware LLC Act pro-
vides that the company “may” provide penalties for breaching loyalty to
the members in the entity’s limited liability company agreement. When a
company does so, however, it provides that the penalties “shall be” speci-
fied for a manager that does not act in accordance with the limited liability
company agreement.220 The passive Sponsor would have standing to chal-
lenge acts of the preferred member with respect to its management
choices. It is first the duty of managers to bring challenges, but where
managers fail to bring an action for breach, a member or assignee of a
membership interest may bring a derivative suit.221
Section 18-1101(c) of the Delaware LLC Act provides that the limited
liability company agreement may expand, contract or eliminate rights and
penalties against a member or manager for violation of duties outlined in
the operating agreement.222 Parenthetically, the provision includes fiduci-
ary duties in addition to those provided in the limited liability company
agreement.223 Allen, et al., note that this parenthetical addition was added
218. For example, the requirements that the sale of pledged collateral be commercial
reasonable is discussed above in supra Section II.D.
219. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-405 (2012).
220. Id. (i) – (ii).
221. Id. § 18-1001.
222. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2012).
223. Id.
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in response to uncertain case law implying the courts would enforce
broader fiduciary duties upon limited liability company managers than
those provided for in the operating agreement.224
In the newly-minted Auriga Capital Corporation v. Gatz Properties,
LLC case,225 the Chancery did away with this uncertainty. So long as the
operating agreement does not contract away the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing,226 the Chancery found that the General Assembly
made clear with this parenthetical addition that it intended to “give maxi-
mum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and the enforceability
of limited liability company agreements.”227
In order to know what fiduciary duties to expand, contract or eliminate
while negotiating the preferred member agreement, parties must be in-
formed to what extent default fiduciary duties apply to limited liability
company managers. Until Auriga, the Chancery had left open the question
of the extent to which default fiduciary duties of loyalty and care applied
to limited liability company managers. The Chancery explained that tradi-
tional default fiduciary duties of loyalty and care apply to management of
limited liability companies noting that “LLC managers are clearly fiducia-
ries . . .”228 because “the manager is vested with discretionary power to
manage the business of the LLC”229 and other members without manage-
ment authority repose “special trust in and reliance on [their] judgment
. . . .”230 Looking to legislative history and the case law presupposed in
that legislative history, the Chancery noted that the legislature was assum-
ing that default duties applied when it enacted Section 18-1101(c). Given
that the statute expressly “incorporates equitable principles”231 and such
principles are the basis for fiduciary duties,232 fiduciary duties attach by
default to limited liability company managers.
The Chancery next considered whether Section 18-1101(c) allows for
parties to contract for a complete waiver of fiduciary duties. Vice-Chancel-
lor Strine explained that according to the language of the statute, the par-
ties may completely eliminate fiduciary duties, or modify them in part.233
Accordingly, where parties eliminate or modify them the Chancery gives
224. WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION 80-81 (3d. ed. 2009).
225. Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Prop., LLC, C.A. 4390-CS, 2012 WL 361677 (Del.
Ch. 2012).
226. See generally ALLEN ET AL., supra note 226, at 80-81.
227. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101 (2012).
228. Auriga Capital Corp., 2012 WL 361677, at 8.
229. Id.
230. Id. (alteration in original).
231. Id. at 9. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1104 (2012) (“In any case not provided for
in this chapter, the rules of law and equity, including the law merchant, shall govern.”).
232. See id. at n. 65.
233. Id. at 9.
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“effect to the parties’ contract choice.”234 If they have not been modified
or eliminated, however, the default fiduciary duties apply.235 Where these
duties are waived, all that remains is the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing derived from contract law.236 While the Chancery noted
some potential policy problems with this approach, it deferred to the Dela-
ware General Assembly’s intent, which allows for contracting away default
fiduciary duties.237
Therefore, the preferred member should be sure to amend the agree-
ment upon its investment to waive default fiduciary duties to any other
members of the Owning SPE, or contract them to the extent necessary for
the preferred member to be comfortable. One might expect pushback on
this from the Sponsor, especially if the preferred member seeks to enjoy
the protections provided by such duties when the Sponsor is in control of
the managing member.
But what does it mean to retain the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing when the fiduciary duties are wholly waived? For instance, if
the operating agreement waives away the duty of loyalty, would the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing limit the managing member of a limited
liability company from obviously self-dealing acts? Chief Justice Steele of
the Delaware Supreme Court has written that he sees the limited liability
company as a creature of contract and that therefore the duty of good
faith and fair dealing binds the manager to a duty to not frustrate the fruits
of the bargain memorialized in the operating agreement.238 Thus, only ma-
terial breaches would appear to give rise to a cause of action. The defini-
tion of a self-dealing transaction is one where a fiduciary makes a decision
on how to dispose of corporate assets in a way that benefits the fiduciary
to the detriment of the company. Therefore, would a self-dealing transac-
tion necessarily frustrate the fruits of the bargain? Or is the possibility of a
self-dealing transaction a risk that is assumed when you contract away the
duty of loyalty?
Both Chief Justice Steele and Vice Chancellor Strine make clear that
the statute allows for contracting away fiduciary duties. The DE LLC Act,
moreover, allows for maximum flexibility.239 It allows members to elimi-
nate or modify fiduciary duties, but it also allows for them to specify spe-
cific duties and penalties for their violation.240 Therefore, parties may
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 9-10.
237. Id. at 25-26.
238. Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in Delaware
Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 221, 223 (2009).
239. Id. at 240. See also, e.g., Elf Atochem North America, Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286,
291 (Del. 1999) (noting the policy of the General Assembly being to give such flexibility by
showing that the LLC Act is replete with default rule provisions that may be modified by the
operating agreement).
240. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-405 (2012).
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waive duties but then carve out specific scenarios they want to protect
against, should they want to do so. From Auriga Capital Corporation, we
know that default fiduciary duties apply and, therefore, where parties wish
to waive fiduciary duties, courts will likely assume parties have contem-
plated the implication of such waivers.241 Being a creature of contract, not
corporate law,242 the limited liability company members therefore assume
any risk associated with the adoption of a provision waiving such duties
and therefore should be bound by the terms of the bargain.243 As such,
there are likely no implied or latent fiduciary duties that will be contra-
vened by a self-dealing transaction if such obligations are waived, so long
as acts do not rise to the level of material breaches of the contract.
Another option for the preferred member would be to seek indemnifi-
cation for any liability arising from breaches of fiduciary duties.244 Either
strategy will place the preferred member in the same economic position,
but there may be unique variables in the negotiating context that would
lead the preferred member to pursue this strategy. For instance, perhaps
the preferred member does not want to waive all the default fiduciary du-
ties in the Sponsor because the specter of fiduciary duty violations imposes
a higher reputational risk on the Sponsor. But to protect himself economi-
cally in the scenario that the preferred member takes over the manage-
ment of the project, the preferred member may be willing to allow for
partial or total indemnification for breaches of such duties that would
lessen the economic impact of a Sponsor breach, so that the preferred
member can enjoy the same protection if it is ever in control.
Preferred membership interests present two other issues distinct to
preferred equity instruments: the risk of equity re-characterization, and
constraints on distributions at state law.
I. Equity Re-characterization and Constraints on Distributions
Preferred equity can take many forms in these deals. The preferred
member agreement often includes fixed distributions, payable regardless
of cash flow, and with mandatory distribution dates as well as a mandatory
redemption date. In such a scenario, the preferred member will often not
share in the residual, opting instead for limited downside exposure in lieu
of upside potential. The members of a deal can structure it with any varia-
tion of the above three variables. Parties might opt for non-guaranteed
distributions and a greater share of the residual. They might allow for flex-
241. Cf. Steele, supra note 240, at 236 (noting that the application of default duties in
the limited liability company context would incent actors to use fiduciary duties ex post be-
cause they believe a jury will be sympathetic to a fiduciary duty theory when ex ante the
parties bargained for the contracting away of such duties).
242. Steele, supra note 240.
243. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN. LAW AND ECONOMICS 201 (Addison-Wes-
ley 3d. ed. 2000) (“[E]conomic efficiency requires enforcing a promise if the promissor and
promissee both wanted enforceability when the promise was made.”) (alteration in original).
244. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-108 (2012).
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ibility in the distribution dates and allow for the accrual of distributions
instead of guaranteed distributions. They might not have a hard and fast
redemption date, and so on.
This section will explore two issues: (1) Is there a substantial likelihood
that a court would re-characterize a preferred investment as debt, thereby
rendering the preferred member an unsecured creditor? (2) What are the
effects of statutory distribution constraints on the ability of the preferred
member to receive its distributions, what rights does the preferred mem-
ber have where as a matter of law the company is unable to distribute and
what, if any, is the effect of equity re-characterization on the balance sheet
or by a court on distribution constraints?
1. Equity Re-characterization
Businesses which have preferred members in their capital structure
may treat preferred equity as debt for accounting purposes under GAAP
rules.245 Similarly, at times some courts hold that preferred equity can be
re-characterized as debt.246 But examples abound where the Delaware
Chancery has refrained from such re-characterization.247 The determina-
tive factor has turned not on how preferred equity was treated from an
accounting perspective, but the actual terms of the preferred position.248
In the Delaware Bankruptcy case, In re Color Tile, Inc., cited by the
Chancery in Harbinger Capital Partners, the determinative factor that led
the court to refuse re-characterization of the preferred shares was that the
holders’ liquidation preference only allowed payment “out of the assets of
the Company available to its stockholders . . . [which meant that] the pre-
ferred . . . interests as class were junior to corporation’s secured creditors
in the context of liquidation.”249 The Harbinger court noted that the pre-
ferred shares in question in the case were equity as a matter of law be-
cause the equity instruments gave their holders no right to guaranteed
distributions, not because they were referred to as equity in the instrument
evidencing their interests.250 The Chancery also noted that the instruments
gave their holders no right to redeem, cutting in favor of characterizing
them as equity.251
245. See ACCOUNTING FOR CERTAIN FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS WITH CHARACTERISTICS
OF BOTH LIABILITIES AND EQUITY, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 150 (Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd. 2003); see, e.g., Harbinger Capital Partners Master Fund I, Ltd. v.
Granite Broad. Corp., 906 A.2d 218 (Del. Ch. 2006) (showing a defendant corporation apply-
ing FAS 150).
246. See, e.g., Costa Brava P’ship, III, L.P. v. Telos Corp., 2006 WL 1313985 (Md. Cir.
Ct. Mar. 30, 2006).
247. See, e.g., Harbinger Capital Partners Master Fund I, Ltd. v. Granite Broad. Corp.,
906 A.2d 218 (Del. Ch. 2006).
248. Id. at 230.
249. In re Color Tile, Inc., Civ.A 98-358-SLR, 2000 WL 152129, at 5 (Bankr D. Del.
Feb. 9, 2000) (alteration in original).
250. Harbinger Capital Partners Master Fund I, Ltd., 906 A.2d at 231.
251. Id.
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For those contemplating a preferred investment in a limited liability
company formed in Delaware, Harbinger is a reason for pause. Under its
holding, rights to guaranteed distributions and a mandatory redemption
date,252 because they give the equity holder a right to payment beyond a
claim to the residual value of the company inconsistent with the rights
normally accorded to equity investors,253 militate against a finding that the
preferred member interest is equity. Harbinger may be distinguished in
that it was a case where a preferred member sought re-characterization in
order to have standing under the Delaware Fraudulent Transfer Act, but
the rules enunciated could transfer easily to a context where the preferred
holder sought an opposite end.
Two other factors may also lead to re-characterization of equity as
debt: the adequacy of capitalization in the company and whether the rate
of return on the investment is characteristic of debt or equity. The Harbin-
ger court cited to cases involving tax disputes, where jurisprudence on re-
characterization has been developed considerably. In tax disputes, how-
ever, it must be noted that it is usually the Internal Revenue Service who
challenges the characterization of an investment as debt because the pay-
ments on debt are deductible by the payor.254 Such courts may find that
thin or inadequate capitalization cuts in favor of re-characterization of a
shareholder loan as equity.255 By negative implication, if the preferred eq-
uity investment sits atop a large common equity cushion, this may cut in
favor of re-characterization as debt. Similarly, if the rate of return on a
debt instrument is more akin to that which is more characteristic of equity,
tax authorities may re-characterize it as equity.256 Again, by negative im-
plication, where a preferred investment has a rate of return more like the
market rates for debt instruments, this could cut in favor of re-characteri-
zation as debt.
The impact of re-chararacterizing preferred shares as debt would be to
make the preferred member an unsecured creditor because it has no per-
fected security interest in the membership interests of the Owning SPE or
the Borrower SPE. In the event of liquidation the preferred member
turned creditor would do no worse than it would have as a preferred mem-
ber because as a creditor of the Owning SPE it will be entitled to be paid
in full before any equity holder in the Owning SPE receives payment.
252. Mandatory distributions are fixed returns, like commonly found in a debt security.
With such mandatory distributions often comes a cap on, or total absence of participation in,
returns from the residual funds of the company after all preferred members and creditors
have been paid for their accrued distributions and capital investment and any rights to pay-
ments from capital events.
253. See Harbinger Capital Partners Master Fund I, Ltd., 906 A.2d at 230.
254. See, e.g., Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394, 401 (5th Cir. 1972).
255. Cf. id.
256. David P. Hariton, Distinguishing Between Equity and Debt in the New Financial
Environment, 431 PRACTICING LAW INST. TAX LAW & EST. PLAN. COURSE HANDBOOK SE-
RIES, 1253, 1310 (1998).
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Were a court to re-characterize, a potential draw-back is that the pre-
ferred member may lose management or consent rights over the Owning
SPE and, therefore, the Borrowing SPE, if the court decides to treat the
preferred equity holder’s major decision rights as belonging only to a
member of the Owning SPE and not applicable as loan covenants upon a
re-characterization of the preferred member’s equity investment into debt.
In effect, it could lose its ability to control its own destiny including,
among other things, the ability to control the filing of bankruptcy. These
control rights are precisely what the preferred member had bargained for
in becoming a preferred member.
While this is theoretically a concern, in practical terms it would seem to
be a perverse result. First, in general, in a re-characterization case, a third
party creditor or taxing authority is often seeking to have debt re-charac-
terized as equity and not the other way around.257 Perhaps for financial
reporting or tax accounting the preferred equity may be treated as debt,
but this should not affect the bargained-for legal rights between the Spon-
sor, who after all agreed to such rights, and the preferred equity investor.
Where the authors could see this issue arising is in a case where the Spon-
sor filed the Owning SPE into bankruptcy and then defends against a mo-
tion to dismiss brought by the preferred equity investor on the grounds
that the provisions granting a consent right to file to preferred equity in-
vestor were simply loan covenants and therefore not enforceable to pre-
vent the filing.
While the authors are not aware of a reported decision so holding, an-
other potential danger is that the preferred investment could be re-charac-
terized as debt of the Sponsor or any other equity member pre-existing the
preferred investment. A simple example will illustrate the concern. Sup-
pose the Borrower SPE needs more capital to service its debt under the
senior mortgage loan. The capital call will go to the members of the Bor-
rower SPE. The membership interests are held by the Owning SPE and so
the members of the Owning SPE bear the onus of the capital call. This is a
scenario where the members of the Owning SPE might seek a preferred
investment or mezzanine loan. Assuming they sought a preferred invest-
ment, and one member kicked in his share of the capital call and the Spon-
sor did not. The preferred investment flows in and covers the Sponsor’s
share. The Sponsor would be deemed to have fulfilled its obligation under
the capital call, but the benefit of later distributions attributable to this
capital infusion would flow to the preferred member. In this scenario the
preferred investment could, in theory, be deemed by a court as debt ex-
tended to the Sponsor.
This would be a very unfortunate result for the preferred member be-
cause, not only would it lose its management and consent rights over the
Owning SPE, but it would have no claim against the Owning SPE at all. In
a scenario where the Sponsor has no other assets other than its interests in
257. See, e.g., Estate of Mixon, 464 F.2d at 401.
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the Owning SPE, the preferred member would thereby be limited to chas-
ing any distributions made to the Sponsor by virtue of the Sponsor’s equity
interests in the Owning SPE. As with the re-characterization as debt of the
Owning SPE, this is not what the preferred member bargained for.
2. Distribution Constraints258
In this subsection, the authors will look to the distribution constraints
regime under the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act with an eye to
the practical impact on the preferred member’s receipt of its distributions.
Under Delaware law, a limited liability company may not make distri-
butions to its members where, after the distribution, all the liabilities of
the company exceed the fair market valuation of its assets.259 The distribu-
tion must be challenged within three years of the distribution.260 Where a
creditor has recourse limited to a specified security interest in property of
the company, the debt held by such creditor is not included in the calcula-
tion of liabilities.261 Any property that is subject to a security interest of
the limited liability company may be included in the assets calculation to
the extent that its fair market value exceeds the liability for which it is
attached as a security interest.262 A member who receives a distribution
knowing that the limited liability company making the distribution was
statutorily insolvent at the time such member received the distribution is
liable to the company for the amount of the distribution, upon challenge
from another member.263 This liability can be waived under Section 18-
502(b), but it must be done through an amendment to the operating
agreement.264
Section 18-607 is thus a balance sheet test. The Delaware Chancery
described the test as a prohibition against “the stripping of corporate as-
sets so as to render an LLC insolvent . . . .”265 Therefore, the relevant
258. While this section focuses on distributions of dividends, the same principles apply
to mandatory redemption rights. Cf. ThoughtWorks, Inc v. SV Inv. Partners, LLC, 902 A.2d
745 (Del. Ch. 2006) (holding, in the C-corp context, that companies are obligated to redeem
shares with redemption rights to the extent they may legally do so under the distribution
constraints of Delaware Law and emphasizing that redemption rights are a contract term
bargained for by the parties and therefore enforceable to the extent legally possible).
259. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-607 (2012).
260. Id. § 18-607(c).
261. Id. For example, under the language of the statute, a non-recourse junior mortgage
at the Borrower SPE would not be included.
262. Id.
263. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-607(b) (2012).
264. Id. § 18-502(b). For a discussion of the use of § 18-502(b) to waive liability for an
unlawful distribution, see Joint Task Force of Committee on LLCs, Partnerships and Unin-
corporated & Entities and the Committee on Taxation, ABA Section of Business Law, Model
Real Estate Development Operating Agreement with Commentary, 63 BUS. LAW. 385, 510
(2008).
265. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Salisbury, Md. v. Handy, No. 1973-S, 2000 WL 364199
(Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 2000) (emphasis added).
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inquiry is not related to cash flow insolvency, the ability to pay debts as
they become due.266 Jurisprudence on the balance sheet test of the limited
liability company statute is nonexistent. Looking to corporate law jurispru-
dence on the subject, however, is instructive.267 While Chief Justice Steele
cautioned that it may not be appropriate in a fiduciary duty analysis to
import corporate law jurisprudence to the limited liability company con-
text,268 in the context of distribution constraints, the policy animating the
law is the protection of creditors from company misrepresentations as to
the financial viability of the company and acts that shift company assets
out of the company after the creditor extends credit (with the principals of
the company hiding behind the limited liability shield)269 is arguably appli-
cable across contexts.
The balance sheet test in Delaware is largely a product of common law,
but the Chancery has applied it inconsistently. For instance, in one case
the Chancery applied a strict balance sheet test, declaring that “an entity is
insolvent when it has liabilities in excess of a reasonable market value of
assets held.”270 Other cases include an additional element to the strict test
that there be “no reasonable prospect that the business can be continued
in the face thereof.”271 The latter narrows the number of corporations that
would be deemed insolvent because the corporation would have the op-
portunity to show that, even though their balance sheet shows strict insol-
vency, the corporation has a reasonable prospect to continue business,
which includes fulfilling the obligations they have to creditors.272 This
study does not seek to resolve this dispute. Instead, it will analyze the
implications of both approaches for the purposes of the preferred mem-
ber’s receipt of its distributions.
These aforementioned cases deal with the standing of creditors to
bring fiduciary duty claims against managers of corporations. While this
case law is related to creditor standing for challenging corporate acts while
the corporation is insolvent and thus is not directly related to distribution
constraints, as outlined above this case law is instructive as to how Dela-
266. See Patrocinio v. Yalanis, 492 A.2d 215, 218 (Conn. App. 1985), for a discussion of
the distinction between the balance sheet test and the insolvency tests.
267. Chief Justice Steele of the Delaware Supreme Court, in his analysis of fiduciary
duties as applied to limited liability companies, noted that developing “an entirely new body
of law . . . would be an unwise course for Delaware, given its rich common law of corpora-
tions readily adaptable, where appropriate to . . . limited liability companies.” Myron T.
Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited
Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 8-9 (2007).
268. Id.
269. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 226, at 131.
270. Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 789 (Del. Ch. 1992).
271. North American Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92,
98 (Del. 2007).
272. Robert J. Stearn, Jr. & Cory D. Kandestin, Delaware’s Solvency Test: What is it
and Does it Make Sense? A Comparison of Solvency Tests Under the Bankruptcy Code and
Delaware Law,  36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 165, 174 (2011).
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ware courts think about balance sheet tests. Moreover, it is relevant be-
cause it shows that creditors may stand in the shoes of shareholders to file
a fiduciary duty action against management.273 Section 18-607(b) of the
DE LLC Act provides that the member who receives the distribution in
violation of this Section will be liable to the limited liability company.274
With the power given through this case law, the creditor may therefore
stand in the shoes of the limited liability company to bring a claim for a
wrongful distribution where the limited liability company is insolvent.
An important thing to notice about Delaware’s balance sheet test is the
allowance of a fair market valuation on the assets side and the apparent
limitation of the liabilities side to book value. The legislature makes clear
that it knows how to add a fair market value standard by its including one
on the asset side, which arguably evinces a legislative intent to limit the
liabilities side to book value.275 While this is likely of little practical impor-
tance because limited liability companies in these deals are not likely to
issue privately or publicly-placed bonds,276 were the Owning SPE to do so,
the company would not be allowed to mark down its debt based on secon-
dary market valuations.
It is unclear from the statute how to characterize preferred equity for
purposes of the distribution constraints. Does the GAAP standard appli-
cable to valuation of the asset side imply that a GAAP standard should be
applied to the characterization of preferred equity as debt? If so, in a sce-
nario where preferred equity is characterized as debt for accounting pur-
poses, does that mean that preferred equity would be placed outside of
distribution constraints at state law? If not, would jurisprudence in other
contexts related to equity re-characterization be used to determine
whether a preferred investment in the Owning SPE is to be treated as a
liability for distribution constraints?
a. Preferred Equity: Liability or Shareholder Equity?
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the institutional
body that promulgates the U.S. accounting rules known as Generally Ac-
cepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), requires that some forms of pre-
ferred equity be characterized as debt.277 Where an equity instrument is
273. North American Catholic Educ. Programming Found., 930 A.2d at 101 (“[T]he
creditors of an insolvent corporation have standing to maintain derivative claims against di-
rectors on behalf of the corporation for breaches of fiduciary duties.”) (alteration in original)
(emphasis in original).
274. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-607(b) (2012).
275. See O’Neill v. Town of Middletown, CIV.A. 1069-N, 2006 WL 205071 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 18, 2006), for an example of this principle of statutory construction.
276. The Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6) is silent as
to whether Delaware limited liability companies have the authority to issue bonds.
277. See ACCOUNTING FOR CERTAIN FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS WITH CHARACTERISTICS
OF BOTH LIABILITIES AND EQUITY, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 150 (Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd. 2003).
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“mandatorily redeemable . . . by transferring its assets at a specified or
determinable date (or dates) or upon an event that is certain to occur” is
to be treated as a liability for GAAP purposes.278 Thus, if the preferred
member’s investment has a mandatory redemption date, it shall be treated
as a liability on the balance sheet. But it is not readily assumable that a
court will apply a GAAP standard to the characterization of equity as debt
for purposes of distribution constraints.
A statute is a law, and, therefore, the relevant jurisprudence in Dela-
ware would determine the categorization of the preferred member inter-
ests as equity or debt.279 As noted in the previous section, Delaware
courts may re-characterize equity as debt where there are mandatory,
guaranteed distributions with distribution dates and priority in liquidation
not characteristic of equity.280 A second key factor cutting in favor of re-
characterization would be whether the equity holder is entitled to guaran-
teed distributions. Lastly, whether there is a mandatory redemption date
would also cut in favor of re-characterization.
For purposes of distribution constraints, the preferred member’s posi-
tion may actually obtain greater protection for its distributions if its invest-
ment were re-characterized as debt. If the investment is legally debt, it
would follow that the preferred member’s distributions would fall within
the category of payments that the distribution constraints are intended to
protect.
One reason distribution constraints arguably exist, though, is because
of the informational asymmetry between creditors and debtors. The con-
cerns of misrepresentation of financial condition and the siphoning of
funds to insiders derived from credit extensions common to all creditor
and debtor law, which apply a fortiori where the insiders enjoy the limited
liability shield of the company form, speak to the situation of the creditor
relative to the debtor.281 A creditor is an outsider to the company and
therefore not apprised to all the financial realities of the company. They
thus deserve protection from insider bad acts.
A preferred member of an Owning SPE with all the inside information
that it has access to as a member of the SPE is not similarly situated to a
creditor with respect to the company. To treat a preferred member of the
Owning SPE as a creditor for purposes of the distribution constraints
would give it the protections of an outsider by guaranteeing its payments
278. ACCOUNTING FOR CERTAIN FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS WITH CHARACTERISTICS OF
BOTH LIABILITIES AND EQUITY, Summary of Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No.
150 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2003), available at http://www.fasb.org/summary/
stsum150.shtml.
279. See Harbinger Capital Partners Master Fund I, Ltd. v. Granite Broad. Corp., 906
A.2d 218 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“[t]o believe that [FAS 150] decides the case would grant FASB,
which is neither lawmaker nor judge, the power to fundamentally alter the law’s understand-
ing of the role of preferred shares.”) (alteration in original).
280. See supra Section II.I.1 for a discussion of equity re-characterization.
281. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 226.
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alongside any other creditors regardless of the solvency of the balance
sheet while the preferred member does not suffer from the lack of access
to inside information of the SPE. Where there are additional actual credi-
tors of the SPE, the preferred member’s circumvention of the distribution
constraints could be to the detriment of creditors, which could arguably
undermine the purpose of the limitations on distributions.
Moreover, an additional rationale for the distribution constraints is
that they are simply an expression of the general priority regime in corpo-
rate law. Equity holders are to be paid after debt holders. But where there
are creditors of the Owning SPE, were the preferred member to step into
a position pari passu to the position of such creditors for purposes of re-
ceiving its distributions, this would subvert the legal assumption that eq-
uity holders are paid after debt holders. This assumption undoubtedly
forms part of the legal backdrop against which preferred members and
creditors of the Owning SPE bargain for their terms. The assumption of a
higher priority by the creditor will lead to a lower premium paid for its
capital investment than a preferred member. Similarly, the return on in-
vestment the preferred member bargains for would likely be higher than
the creditor because the preferred member expects a lower priority. This
would subvert market participants’ assumptions, thus undermining the risk
profiles used to determine market rates.
The jurisprudential standard emphasizes mandatory distributions and
liquidation priority not characteristic of equity as the key factors in deter-
mining whether equity should be re-characterized as debt while the
GAAP standard emphasizes mandatory redemption dates. The Harbinger
court also noted that the absence of a redemption right also cut in favor of
finding that the equity instruments in question were equity as a matter of
law.282 Therefore, the GAAP standard would capture more equity instru-
ments than the jurisprudential standard because the Chancery has made
clear, at least in the C-corp context, that mandatory redemptions are sub-
ject to distribution constraints.283 Because the statute is a law, and the
GAAP standard only captures scenarios that will be subject to the distri-
bution constraints, the jurisprudential standard should apply, qualified by
the policy considerations behind the statute already mentioned.
b. Fair Market Valuation of Assets
While it is unclear whether a legal or accounting standard for equity
would apply to the categorization of preferred equity with respect to the
liabilities side of the balance sheet test, the statute clearly indicates that a
fair market valuation must be applied to the assets side. Thus, in the con-
text of an under-productive underlying asset property, the Owning SPE
would be required to mark-to-market the value of the asset shares of the
Borrowing SPE, its only assets. The value of these shares, in turn, is de-
282. Harbinger, 906 A.2d at 230-31.
283. See ThoughtWorks, Inc v. SV Inv. Partners, LLC, 902 A.2d 745 (Del. Ch. 2006).
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pendent on the fair market value of the underlying asset property. FASB
prescribes the types of pricing information relevant to the calculation of
fair market value, to which we now turn.
FASB notes that the fair market value is “a market-based measure-
ment, not an entity-specific measurement” “focus[ing] on the price that
would be received to sell the asset . . . not the price that would be paid to
acquire the asset . . . .”284 Therefore, whatever assumptions market partici-
pants would use to value the asset in contemplation of purchase should be
used to determine the fair market value of the asset.285 FASB prescribes a
hierarchy for sources of evidence for these assumptions. First, market par-
ticipant assumptions arising from the analysis of data by entities other
than the entity that owns the asset or arising from sources outside of the
owning entity (observable inputs) and, second, the entity’s own valuation
according to its reading of “market participant assumptions based on the
best information available in the circumstances (unobservable inputs).”286
Observable inputs that are “reasonably available without undue cost
and effort” must be incorporated in the valuation process by the entity
performing the valuation of its own assets.287 The market for equity inter-
ests in the Borrower SPE will likely be very small, if there is one at all, and
equity interests are not traded on any exchanges. Therefore, the tradi-
tional sources of observable inputs are limited. While small, however,
there is a market of funds and investors who are buy these assets. As such,
it may be incumbent upon the accountants for the Owning SPE to look to
databases and listings of comparative asset properties to update the value
of the Borrowing SPE shares appropriately.288
The weight given to assumptions about the market for commercial real
estate and the risk factors considered in determining the present value of
the Borrower SPE membership interests should probably be disclosed in
footnotes to the balance sheet. Likewise, observable inputs used to derive
such assumptions and the weight given to them should also be disclosed in
the footnotes.
c. Implications of Balance Sheet Test for Preferred Members
Under the strict balance sheet test, if the preferred member interests
were considered liabilities and there were no other liabilities, the Owning
SPE would not be allowed to pay any guaranteed distributions where its
284. See FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENTS, Summary of Statement of Fin. Accounting
Standards No. 157 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2007), available at http://www.fasb.org/
summary/stsum157.shtml (alteration in original).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. But see In re Radiology Assoc., Inc., 611 A.2d 485, 490 (Del. Ch. 1991), for an
example of how fraught the comparative companies analysis can be in the context of a valua-
tion of a closed corporation. The same measurement difficulties could arise in the valuation
of the assets in question in the current study.
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assets, the membership interests in the Borrower SPE, were of lesser value
than the preferred member’s interests. If the Borrower SPE were highly
leveraged, this would reduce the asset side of the Owning SPE because the
service of such debt would diminish the residual cash flows to the Owning
SPE through its membership interests in the Borrowing SPE. This would
thus decrease the value of the Borrower SPE shares on the Owning SPE’s
balance sheet, which in turn would decrease any surplus out of which the
preferred member’s distributions could be paid.
If the “no reasonable prospect that the business can be continued in
the face thereof”289 element were applied, the Owning SPE may be able
to justify distributions to the preferred member where circumstances were
such that, at the moment, the balance sheet was formally insolvent, but the
underlying asset property was likely to produce sufficient cash flow that
the Owning SPE would be able to continue its business.
Absent a guaranty from the Sponsor to make the guaranteed payments
should the Owning SPE be prohibited from doing so by law, the preferred
member would not be permitted to collect its distributions. Its only re-
course would be for breach of contract of the operating agreement or to
take over management of the Owning SPE.
It is probably unlikely that a court would allow for damages where the
company is prohibited by law to make distributions.290 As a practical mat-
ter, as long as there is cash flow to pay the preferred equity, it is unlikely
that the Sponsor member would cause the Owning SPE to not make the
required distributions to the preferred member based upon a failure of
balance sheet insolvency. This result follows from the fact that (i) gener-
ally, in these structures, there would not be any meaningful creditors of
the Owning SPE, and there almost certainly would not be any creditors
not being paid ahead of the preferred member; and (ii) typically if it is not
timely receiving required distributions, the preferred equity member has
the right to replace the Sponsor member as managing member and take
over control of the project (and, therefore, declare distributions).
d. Accrued Dividend Treatment
Under Delaware law, the member of a limited liability company that
has become entitled to a distribution has “the status of, and is entitled to
all remedies available to, a creditor . . . with respect to the distribution.”291
Where an operating agreement provides for guaranteed dividends, upon
the declaration of a dividend, the preferred member would therefore have
the status of a creditor with respect to that amount. The preferred member
289. North American Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92,
98 (Del. 2007).
290. Cf. ThoughtWorks, Inc v. SV Inv. Partners, LLC, 902 A.2d 745 (Del. Ch. 2006)
(holding that redemption right in the C-corp context, which are subject to distribution con-
straints, are enforceable only to the extent of funds legally available, suggesting that the
preferred member’s access to funds would be circumscribed by the distribution constraints).
291. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-606 (2012).
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may, at this point, seek a security interest in the assets of the Owning SPE
as security for the distribution and file a UCC-1 financing statement to put
relevant parties on constructive notice of its interest.292 Upon obtaining a
security interest, the distributions to which the preferred member is enti-
tled could arguably fall outside of the distribution restraint regime. But
even in the absence of a security interest, the preferred member may have
greater rights than it would as a member without accrued dividends.293
While it is unlikely that this would change the preferred member’s posi-
tion in terms of payment priority, the preferred member’s status as credi-
tor could make it a party that enjoys the protections of the distribution
constraints with respect to the accrued dividends, rather than a victim of
them.294
The last issue pertinent to the preferred investment is related to forfei-
ture provisions in the operating agreement, a questionable practice, both
in terms of enforceability and in terms of its effect on the preferred mem-
ber’s reputation.
J. Forfeiture Provisions in the Preferred Membership Agreement
In an effort to secure its investment, a preferred member sometimes
will seek a forfeiture provision that provides for the membership interests
of the Owning SPE to vest in the preferred member where the Owning
SPE breaches the membership agreement. Courts generally look at provi-
sions that trigger forfeiture upon breaching an agreement with
suspicion.295
While no Delaware case law is directly on point, in Walker v. Resource
Development Co., Ltd., L.L.C.,296 a cousin of former president George W.
Bush, Randolph Walker, was cut out of a limited liability company due to
his failure to obtain financing for the venture as was required of him under
the operating agreement. The other members with authority to remove
members not only terminated his membership in the limited liability com-
pany but also declared Walker’s economic interest as forfeit.297 The oper-
ating agreement provided for removal but not the forfeiture of economic
292. Cf. Richard W. Nenno & John E. Sullivan III, Delaware Asset Protection Trusts:
Avoiding Fraudulent Transfers and Attorney Liability, 32 EST. PLAN. 22, 31 (2005).
293. Cf. Frank L. Watson, Jr. & Mary Ann Jackson, The Tennessee Revised Limited
Liability Company Act: A Practitioner’s Guide to Avoiding the Pitfalls, 37 U. MEM. L. REV.
311, 346 (2007) (noting, in reference to the Revised Limited Liability Company Act, which
contains a provision similar to §18-606, the member may have more rights).
294. Cf. Law of Fraudulent Transactions § 5:30 (2011) (noting that the purpose of distri-
bution constraints, like prohibitions against fraudulent transfers, are to protect creditors from
transactions that benefit the equity holders of a corporation to the detriment of the
creditors).
295. See, e.g., Old Time Petroleum Co. v. Turcol, 18 Del. Ch. 121 (Ch. 1931) (“Condi-
tions in a deed which upon breach work a forfeiture of the estate are not favored in law.”).
296. 791 A.2d 799 (Del. Ch. 2000).
297. Id.
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interests.298 The Chancery considered two questions relevant to our pur-
poses: (1) whether the operating agreement of the limited liability com-
pany provided for the forfeiture of economic interests in such a case and, if
not, (2) whether the default rules under the Limited Liability Company
Act gave the other members the right to forfeit Walker’s economic
interest.299
The Chancery explicitly states that the policy position taken by the
Delaware General Assembly is to give effect to the parties’ desires as em-
bodied in the cornerstone document of the limited liability company, the
operating agreement.300 In dicta, Vice-Chancellor Lamb wrote that, had
the other members simply made Walker’s economic interest contingent
upon the closing of the financing deal, they would have been “easily . . .
protected . . . .”301 The court held that the Delaware LLC Act does not
give members any inherent power to cause the forfeiture of other mem-
bers’ economic interests in the venture.302 It looked to other statutes (e.g.,
merger statutes), which provide for an inherent power to eliminate mem-
berships, and noted that even in such statutes a member must be fairly
compensated for its economic interest in the venture upon termination of
its membership.303
On the one hand, the Walker case arguably stands for the principle
that, where an operating agreement provides for the forfeiture of an eco-
nomic interest upon some sort of failure to abide by the operating agree-
ment, the Chancery will enforce the terms of the agreement. Absent clear
provisions for such forfeiture, the default rules of the Delaware LLC Act
will not grant any power to do so. If the limited liability company is a
creature of contract, then the operating agreement could phrase unsatis-
factory performance by the Sponsor as a material breach,304 which would
relieve the other members from honoring its economic interest, acting as a
liquidated damages clause. Where the operating agreement specifies that
the failure of the Sponsor to perform satisfactorily is a material breach, the
298. Id. at 803-09.
299. See id. at 800.
300. Id. at 813 (“. . . LCC members’ rights begin with and typically end with the Operat-
ing Agreement.”).
301. Id. Section 18-502(c) of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act under Title 6
gives the authority for members’ interests in the limited liability company to be reduced or
eliminated for failure to make a contribution the member is obligated to make. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 18-502(c) (2012). Section 18-101 (3) defines contribution as “any cash, property,
services rendered or a promissory note or other obligation to contribute cash or property or
to perform services, which a person contributes to a limited liability company in the person’s
capacity as a member.” Id. § 18-101.
302. 791 A.2d at 815.
303. Id.
304. See 23 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 63:3 (4th ed. 2011) (noting that a material
breach “is a failure to do something that is so fundamental to a contract that the failure to
perform that obligation defeats the essential purpose of the contract.”).
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court will ordinarily have to honor it provided that questions of fact are
resolved in favor of finding unsatisfactory performance.305
On the other hand, the Walker case is distinguishable from our context
in that the economic interests of the plaintiff in the case was a product of
his connections to a financing source. Walker was admitted to the limited
liability company because he promised to provide access to capital, not
because he contributed capital. In the context of real estate deals, the eco-
nomic interest of the preferred member comes from its investment of capi-
tal. The Chancery never referenced the distinction between equity
resulting from something other than capital investment and equity result-
ing from capital investment. However, the Chancery enunciated broad
rules not tied to the particular facts of the Walker case. Therefore, the
holding might arguably apply no matter the source of the economic inter-
est. It follows that where a preferred member negotiates for a provision in
the operating agreement to provide for a forfeiture of the Sponsor’s inter-
ests should the Sponsor fail to meet the obligations set out in the operating
agreement, the Chancery would likely enforce such a provision.
Another consideration is that attempting to obtain a forfeiture provi-
sion would likely be seen as harsh and unseemly. Private equity funds that
specialize in preferred investments will naturally be concerned with pre-
serving and facilitating future deal flow. Therefore, the reputational risks
to the fund and fund manager associated with seeking harsh terms like
forfeiture provisions may outweigh the protective benefits they provide. If
the preferred member is unable to negotiate for a forfeiture provision or is
concerned about its appearance, the preferred member may easily con-
tract for a transfer of control rights in the event of default, as discussed
above in multiple places.
Finally, while the authors are not aware of any cases on point, a forfei-
ture provision could increase the risk that the preferred equity might be
re-characterized as debt. The rationale behind this thought is that the fore-
closure of a lien upon collateral for debt, or upon a judgment lien securing
a judgment upon unsecured debt, results in the elimination (leaving aside
any post-foreclosure redemption rights provided in the mortgage context
under the laws of a handful of states) of the debtor’s interest in the collat-
eral. A forfeiture would result in a similar elimination of interests in the
entity as opposed to simply rendering the Sponsor member passive with
subordinated cash flow rights, which is the more traditional remedy for a
breach of obligations in an equity transaction.
We now turn to the issue of whether the traditional equitable mortgage
doctrine should apply to mezzanine loans and preferred member invest-
ments. This issue has not yet come before a court, but one author has
argued in favor of characterizing these funding mechanisms as mortgages.
The risk of such re-characterization of the instruments as mortgages is an
issue about which counsel for the mezzanine lender or preferred investor
305. Id.
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should be aware, as it could form grounds for a challenge to their attempts
to exercise their rights upon default or breach.
IV. SHOULD MEZZANINE LOANS AND PREFERRED EQUITY
INVESTMENTS BE TREATED AS EQUITABLE MORTGAGES?
In “Once A Mortgage, Always A Mortgage”—The Use (and Misuse of)
Mezzanine Loans and Preferred Equity Investments, Andrew R. Berman
argues that the equity gap mechanisms discussed here are mortgage
equivalents and, as such, should be treated by courts as equitable mort-
gages.306 However, treating these mechanisms as equitable mortgages
would stifle real estate investment and provide undue protections to so-
phisticated borrowers.
Berman gives the following reasoning to show that courts should treat
these funding mechanisms as mortgages. He begins by noting that courts
circumvented the “freedom of contract” theory by looking beyond the
document to discern the “true substance of the debt transaction.”307 He
continues that the parcel of real property that serves as the security inter-
est for the senior loan, in substance, forms the security interest for mezza-
nine loans or the membership interests of the preferred member in the
Owning SPE.308 The Owning SPE typically has only one corporate pur-
pose: the owning of membership interests of the Borrower SPE and, there-
fore, has no other assets.309 The value of the membership interests of the
Borrower SPE is derived solely from the cash flows and underlying equity
in the mortgaged property, held by the Borrower SPE.310 Thus, albeit indi-
rectly, the shares of the Owning SPE used as collateral for the mezzanine
loan or purchased by the preferred equity member derive their value from
the underlying property that forms the security interest of the senior mort-
gage.311 Therefore, the mezzanine lender and the preferred member (be-
cause preferred equity is economically similar to a mezzanine loan), in
substance, are giving loans secured by an interest in the subject property,
which is substantively equivalent to a mortgage. Ergo, courts should treat
them as mortgages under the “once a mortgage, always a mortgage”
maxim.
As a matter of first impression, Berman’s argument appears reasonable
given the common law tradition of treating agreements that are substan-
tively equivalent to mortgages as mortgages. Upon closer look, however,
accepting Berman’s argument would require adherence to a policy stance
taken for the protection of unsuspecting, unsophisticated mortgagors in
equity courts of common law England, to sophisticated borrowers, who
306. 11 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 76 (2005).
307. Id. at 116.
308. Id. at 113-15.
309. Id. at 114.
310. See id. at 114-15.
311. Id.
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consciously seek additional funding to fill the gap created by the prohibi-
tion against junior mortgages and limits senior lenders maintain on their
loan-to-value ratios or to fund the gap between the value of the a first
senior mortgage and the value of the mortgage obtained for
refinancing.312
While it is more likely than not that an agreement that looks and acts
like a mortgage will be treated as mortgages by courts,313 courts have not
been unresponsive to changing economic realities in real estate finance
and have found ostensibly mortgage-like agreements not to be equitable
mortgages.314 Were a court to be presented with the issue of whether mez-
zanine loans to a SPE or a preferred member’s investment in an SPE are
mortgages, it should not only look to whether in substance the transac-
tion’s debt is secured by real property, but should also look to the facts of
the transaction to see if the spirit of the equitable doctrines of mortgage
law are also applicable.
Berman never addresses the substantive inquiry of why mezzanine
debt and preferred equity should be treated as mortgages, instead apply-
ing an equitable maxim in a legalistic manner. But the “once a mortgage,
always a mortgage” maxim has been attached with less vigor in commer-
cial deals on the basis that the central thrust of the maxim was to prevent
“clogging” the equity of redemption,315 and that such prohibitions are less
likely to be necessary in the commercial real estate context.316 Therefore,
because the central goal of the maxim applied by Berman is to confirm the
attachment of the equity of redemption doctrine, one must ask if it makes
sense to attach the equity of redemption doctrine to commercial mezza-
nine loans and preferred equity investments.
The central goal of equitable redemption in mortgage law is to pro-
mote fairness.317 Where an unsuspecting, unsophisticated mortgagor is in
an unfair bargaining position, equity therefore requires extra protections,
because actors in exigent or needful circumstances are “not . . . free men,
312. See Preble & Cartwright, supra note 26, at 829 (commenting that the application of
the “once a mortgage, always a mortgage” maxim was in response to “surprise, [and] the
unexpected detriment to the mortgagor, and the unconscionable advantage taken by the
mortgagee of the hapless, unknowing and ill advised mortgagor” which is hardly the descrip-
tion of a sophisticated real estate investor).
313. See Marshall E. Tracht, Renegotiation and Secured Credit: Explaining the Equity of
Redemption, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 599 (1999) (commenting that the attachment of equitable re-
demption rights to mortgages is largely unquestioned at this point).
314. Id. (noting that equity of redemption doctrine has not been intractably applied in
modern real estate finance law).
315. Preble & Cartwright, supra note 26, at 825.
316. Id. at 829 (noting that a commercial deal is less likely to be an “oppressive bargain
where the borrower is at the mercy of an unscrupulous lender” and is therefore less likely to
receive equitable protection) (citing Knightsbridge Estates Trust, Ltd. v. Byrne, [1939] 1 Ch.
441, 445).
317. Id. at 828.
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but . . . will submit to any terms that the crafty may impose upon them”318
to keep their estates.319 Such terms may result in usury and forfeiture,
anathemas to fairness.
Scholars have attacked the economic rationality of the equity of re-
demption doctrine in general, but have done so with particular vigor in the
commercial context. Marshall E. Tracht notes that the courts’ continual
insistence, even in commercial deals, on the attachment of equity of re-
demption protection based on a fair bargaining rationale is insufficient for
two reasons. First, in a competitive market for funding, a lender will not
attempt to extract usurious terms from a sophisticated borrower because
the borrower will choose another lender who does not seek such terms.320
Second, even where market failures lead to limited funding options, the
lender who has an unfair bargaining position will simply shift its extortion-
ate effort from a forfeiture clause to some other usurious term, such as
higher interest, to circumvent forfeiture prohibitions, rendering such
prohibitions impotent.321
Some argue the equitable redemption doctrine leads to market ineffi-
ciencies such as higher interest rates across the board for all borrowers.322
Schill sees no problem with this, equating equitable redemption doctrine
to mandatory insurance imposed on the borrower to cover the risk of irra-
tional optimism, insuring against unforeseen inabilities to meet the terms
of the mortgage agreement.323 Lenders simply spread the cost of such irra-
tionality amongst all mortgagors. However, Schill argues that this ratio-
nale is most applicable in the consumer context, not the commercial,
because commercial players are less susceptible to irrational optimism.324
Notwithstanding the irrationality of applying the equity of redemption
doctrine to commercial deals, Tracht argues that the equity of redemption
doctrine in the commercial context may be explained as a facilitator of
reasonable renegotiation. Specifically, he argues that it could be under-
stood as a partial response to two distinct problems in the mortgage rela-
318. Vernon v. Bethell, (1762) 28 Eng. Rep. 838, 839.
319. But see William M. McGovern, Jr., Forfeiture, Inequality of Bargaining Power, and
the Availability of Credit: An Historical Perspective, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 141, 146-47 (1979)
(showing that the primary mortgagors in the period wherein the equity of redemption had its
genesis were wealthy merchants, perhaps undermining the traditional rationale for the
doctrine).
320. Tracht, supra note 315, at 613.
321. Id. at 613-14.
322. Id. at 615. See also Terrence M. Clauretie, The Impact of Interstate Foreclosure
Cost Differences and the Value of Mortgages on Default Rates, 15 REAL ESTATE ECON. 152
(1987); Mark Meador, The Effects of Mortgage Laws on Home Mortgage Rates, 34 J. ECON.
& BUS. 143, 146-47 (1982).
323. Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L.
REV. 489, 495-500 (1991). See also E.N.D., Note, The Basis of Relief from Penalties and For-
feitures, 20 MICH. L. REV. 646, 647 (1922) (noting that the “overly-sanguine” borrower with
“faith in a special providence” was often the basis for equitable protection).
324. Tracht, supra note 315, at 616-17 (citing Schill, supra note 323, at 535-36).
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tionship—the bilateral monopoly (borrower and lender are the only
parties that can meet each other’s respective needs related to the subject
debt transaction)325 and problem of opportunistic renegotiation strategies
(lender may attempt to threaten default to obtain more favorable
terms)326—by defining the terms and sequence of events where the bor-
rower defaults.327 But even Tracht recognizes that this is, at best, a partial
explanation for the otherwise irrational application of equitable redemp-
tion doctrine to commercial mortgages.328
A second policy issue is with respect to economic and control rights. At
common law, economic and control rights were intermingled in the same
property such that it made no sense to address them separately. For in-
stance, a farmer mortgagor would not only use its land for economic pro-
ductivity, but also would live on the land. Thus, the sting of forfeiture
would not only include lost future economic rights, but also the farmer’s
home. In the modern commercial real estate deal, however, the mortgagor
has only economic interests because the mortgagor’s sole interest is in the
rents and profits from the real property. While the mortgagor maintains a
right to control the premises of the property, such control is only relevant
to the mortgagor because it facilitates the generation of rents and profits.
Assuming the mortgagor does not occupy the premises, therefore, the eq-
uitable redemption doctrine may not apply with the same force because
commercial deals are arguably more fungible than a person’s home.329
Where a borrower is sophisticated and fully capable of understanding
the implications of the agreement it signs, equitable arguments are less
persuasive. The above exposition shows that the attachment of the equity
of redemption doctrine to actual commercial mortgages has been vigor-
ously attacked. The operation of the “once a mortgage, always a mort-
gage” maxim extends the attachment of this doctrine to mortgage-like
agreements. Given that the application of the doctrine to actual mortgages
is challenged in the context of commercial deals, a thoughtful person will
question whether the a court should extend the doctrine to agreements in
the commercial context explicitly intended not to be mortgages by sophis-
ticated parties via this equitable maxim.
The equitable limitations placed on mortgage-like agreements at com-
mon law were created to limit lender practices of forcing forfeiture,
325. Id. at 626-28.
326. Id. at 628-29.
327. Id. at 630-35.
328. Id. at 630 (“The equity of redemption may provide a partial cure for these twin
problems.”) (emphasis added).
329. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959-61
(1982) (commenting that, consistent with her personhood theory of property, there are assets
that are fungible and assets that are non-fungible. A commercial deal is more fungible than a
person’s home on the theory that the value of the latter is derived more from personal at-
tachment and control, while the value of the former is derived from rents and profits, which
may be obtained elsewhere).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\1-1\MPE104.txt unknown Seq: 65 31-JUL-12 9:52
Spring 2012] Mezzanine Finance and Preferred Equity Investment 157
whereas the equity gap mechanisms are efforts by borrowers to comport
with lender covenants that prohibit borrowers from filling this gap through
junior mortgages. This is not a case of a lender attempting to circumvent
equitable protections to take advantages of unsuspecting, irrationally opti-
mistic borrowers. This is a case of borrowers seeking additional funding in
order to consummate their deals while following rating agencies’ recom-
mendations to structure their transactions in order to comply with CMBS
requirements. That is, equity gap financing is a response by sophisticated
borrowers attempting to meet their needs in the marketplace. Thus, the
equitable ground upon which the attachment of the “once a mortgage,
always a mortgage” maxim is normally based is inapplicable. Moreover,
dating back to the early 20th Century, common law courts have shown
respect for freedom of contract and under many circumstances have found
that agreements with mortgage-like properties were not necessarily mort-
gages, especially in the commercial context.330
Preble and Cartwright identify the central consideration in determining
whether a mortgage-like agreement should be an equitable mortgage and
two categories of agreements where courts have not found mortgage-like
agreements to be equitable mortgages. First, they emphasize that the in-
tent of the parties is always paramount when deciding whether to apply
the “once a mortgage, always a mortgage” maxim.331 Absent independent
equitable grounds for the attachment of the equitable protections, such as
unfair dealing or undue pressure,332 the courts would not deem mortgage-
like agreements equitable mortgages.333 Where the intent of the parties
was akin to a mortgage and the strict enforcement of the terms would lead
to a surprising, unfair forfeiture of the property, it would be deemed a
mortgage. But where it was not, it would be treated as a contract subject
only to contract law procedural limitations and gap-fillers.
Mezzanine loans and preferred equity investments are expressly in-
tended not to be mortgages. That is, the members of the Owning SPE ex-
pressly seek alternative financing mechanisms, with recourse limited to the
foreclosure on the membership interests of the Borrower SPE and subse-
quent capture of the Borrower SPE, in the case of the mezzanine lender,
or capturing of control through taking over as managing member of the
Owning SPE in the case of preferred member. Once the preferred mem-
ber takes control of the Owning SPE or mezzanine lender takes control of
the Borrower SPE, it still has to cure the senior loan if it is in default,
330. See, e.g., DeBeers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. British South Africa Co., (1910) 2 Ch.
502, rev’d, [1912] A.C. 52 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (finding separate commercial con-
tract secured by real property was not a mortgage); London & Globe Fin. Corp. v. Montgom-
ery, (1902) 18 T.L.R. 661 (explaining that purchase option not a mortgage); Reeve v. Lisle,
[1902] A.C. 461 (appeal taken from Eng.) (finding passage of days made an option contract a
separate agreement from the mortgage); Davies v. Chamberlain, (1909) 25 T.L.R. 766, aff’d,
26 T.L.R. 138 (finding purchase and sale agreement not a mortgage).
331. Preble & Cartwright, supra note 26, at 827.
332. See Mainland v. Upjohn, [1889] 41 Ch. 126 (Eng.).
333. Preble & Cartwright, supra note 26, at 827-28.
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perform under the senior mortgage agreement, refinance, or surrender the
property to the Senior Lender.
Preble and Cartwright show that where there are separate and inde-
pendent transactions, an alleged clog in the right to redeem will be re-
jected.334 For instance, in Reeve v. Lisle, the passage of several days
between transactions sufficed to separate the transactions.335 In DeBeers
Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. British South Africa Company, a commercially
reasonable mining contract was sustained because the security phase of
the contract was sufficiently separated.336
Relatedly, the second category Preble and Cartwright outline are those
where the loan is part of a larger, complex transaction.337 In MacArthur v.
North Palm Beach Utilities, Inc., the lender lent money secured by real
property, but the agreement also contained an option to buy the sewage
and water system at the cost of the borrower paid to develop it.338 The
option there was not supported by any independent consideration. The
borrower received the loan from the lender but when the two parties were
unable to agree on the option’s exercise price, the borrower claimed a
clogging defense against the option, requesting that the Florida court find
the option to be an equitable mortgage. The court refused because to do
so would have been to allow the borrower to benefit from the bargain but
not bear its costs. Thus, the option was enforced according to its terms.
While, unlike in the MacArthur case, the preferred equity and mezza-
nine loan is typically provided by a separate entity than the senior lender,
the legal principle should apply here as well. Why should a borrower who
receives the benefit of a separate bargain from the mortgage and con-
sciously enters into an agreement for funding its equity gap be able to
renege on the costs of that agreement when it defaults?339 As noted in the
previous section, a sophisticated borrower should be held to the agree-
ment it signs. At the very least, again, courts should look to the facts of the
transaction rather than turning the “once a mortgage, always a mortgage”
equitable maxim into a rule of law.
Aside from these arguments, two last points are worth mentioning.
First, mezzanine loans and preferred equity investments are already sub-
ject to legal regimes offering protections to the debtor or regular equity
investor. In the case of mezzanine loans, the mezzanine lender is subject to
the UCC foreclosure regime when it seeks to foreclose on the Borrower
SPE membership interests. This UCC foreclosure process typically takes
334. Id. at 828.
335. [1902] A.C. 461 (appeal taken from Eng.).
336. (1910) 2 Ch. 502, rev’d, [1912] A.C. 52 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
337. Preble & Cartwright, supra note 26, at 837.
338. 202 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1967).
339. See Kreglinger v. New Patagonia Meat & Cold Storage Co., [1913] UKHL 1, [1914]
A.C. 25 (Lord Parker of Waddington) (noting that the borrower in question sought “relief
from a contract which they admit to be fair and reasonable and of which they have already
enjoyed the full advantage.”).
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between 30-45 days with a right to redeem the interests retained by the
previous owners.340 In a right of sale state, the foreclosure process on a
mortgaged property sometimes takes less than 30 days, with sales being
final to any bona fide purchaser.341 Thus, the time period for redemption
does not necessarily contract the time available for redemption. While in
the case of the preferred member the process might be more quickly con-
summated, absent a foreclosure provision, the other economic interests of
the Sponsor or any other equity member of the Owning SPE are generally
not extinguished, obviating any concern of unfair forfeiture. In the case of
preferred equity, the preferred investor is subject to compliance with the
laws applicable to the members or partners generally. For example, a pre-
ferred equity investor in a Delaware limited liability company is subject to
the Delaware LLC Act and the body of case law interpreting that Act. So
for example, as discussed earlier, a preferred equity investor who takes
over management control of the Owning Entity is subject to the duty of
good faith and fair dealing.
The second point is that, unlike in the prototypical equitable mortgage
situation, neither the mezzanine lender nor the preferred equity investor
has any direct interest in the underlying real estate. As a result, the mezza-
nine lender and the preferred equity investor have none of the protections
which such an interest would afford. For example, if any lien, whether con-
sensual or not, is filed upon the property, the mezzanine lender and the
preferred equity investor (subject to a potential right of the preferred eq-
uity investor to challenge the granting of any such lien which it did not
consent to where its consent was required under the applicable operating
agreement) take subject to such lien. If the mezzanine lender or preferred
equity investor had held a prior mortgage, they would have been able to
take free of such lien by foreclosure. Unless one were to subordinate after
arising interests to the equitable mortgage, a result of converting a mezza-
nine loan into an equitable mortgage would be to impose upon the mezza-
nine lender all of the foreclosure requirements appertaining to a mortgage
and none of the benefits. Additionally, the mezzanine lender would cer-
tainly have to comply with the requirements of a UCC sale, otherwise
other creditors of the mezzanine borrower that may be senior to the mez-
zanine lender would be effectively structurally subordinated.
To subvert the intention of the parties and to intervene judicially into a
private market solution to a problem particular to structured finance, by
forcing mezzanine lenders and preferred investors to contribute to the eq-
uity gap, would unnecessarily add uncertainty to the market. To introduce
such uncertainty would chill direct investment, thereby undermining the
340. See U.C.C. § 9-623 (2011) (providing the right to redeem before the sale or accept-
ance of collateral as partial or full payment).
341. See David Gray Carlson, Critique of Money Judgment Part One: Liens on New
York Real Property, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1291, 1295 (2008) (noting that the bona fide
purchaser receives the property free of unrecorded liens, etc.).
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market for CMBS and stifling liquidity available to value adding commer-
cial real estate projects.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has led the reader through the genesis, rise, and legal reali-
ties of two alternative funding mechanisms, preferred equity and mezza-
nine debt, which arose to fill the equity gap created by the loan to value
ratio limits on commercial mortgages and the negative covenants against
junior liens on the underlying real properties. This study does not intend
to be an exhaustive treatment of the legal issues that must be considered
when structuring these investments, but it has hopefully shed light on
some of the most important ones. From the perfection of the mezzanine
lender’s collateral, to shadow of the federal bankruptcy regime that looms
over all entrepreneurial endeavors, from the fiduciary duties the preferred
members may owe when they take control of the Owning SPE, to the dis-
tribution constraints, the risks of equity re-characterization, and the en-
forceability of forfeiture provisions, this survey has attempted to provide
an extensive outline of pertinent issues for counsel to consider.
One of the hoped-for takeaways from this article is an understanding
of some of the primary similarities and differences between mezzanine
loans and preferred equity investments. Mezzanine loans and preferred
equity investments play similar roles in the capital structure of a transac-
tion, each generally has similar economics, and each is subject to liens
upon the underlying real estate and non-lien holding creditors of mortgage
borrower.
Notwithstanding the broad similarities, a mezzanine loan is debt of the
entity that holds the equity in the entity that owns the underlying real
estate, the Owning SPE, and a preferred equity investment is equity gen-
erally in the Owning SPE. As outlined above, there are also a number of
significant differences between these subordinate financing mechanisms.
These differences include:
(i) the mezzanine lender is generally able to obtain a comprehensive
inter-creditor agreement from the Senior Lender, whereas the pre-
ferred equity investor often is not;
(ii) a mezzanine lender’s realization upon the pledged equity in the
Borrower SPE eliminates all of the indirect interests of the Sponsor in
the Borrower SPE, whereas, when a preferred equity investor exer-
cises its remedies to take control of the Owning SPE, the Sponsor
generally becomes passive but retains its indirect interest in the Bor-
rower SPE;
(iii) as a result of Sponsor maintaining such an interest, a preferred
equity investor will owe the Sponsor member a duty of good faith and
fair dealing (and any other fiduciary duties that are not waived) after
it takes over control of the Owning SPE, whereas the mezzanine
lender owes no such duty after the UCC sale;
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(iv) generally, the mezzanine lender must hold a UCC sale to realize
upon the pledged equity and gain control of the Borrower SPE,
whereas the preferred equity investor does not need to hold such a
sale and, depending upon the terms of the applicable operating or
limited partnership agreement, can take over control of the Owning
SPE and, therefore, of the Borrower SPE within a matter of days;
(v) the preferred equity investor typically has approval rights over a
bankruptcy filing by the Owning SPE or the Borrower SPE and is
much better able to prevent such a filing than a mezzanine lender.
The preferred equity investor is also in a better position to prevent or
challenge as unauthorized prohibited transfers of or liens upon the
underlying real estate;
(vi) with respect to a mezzanine loan, provided it holds a perfected
first priority lien, the mezzanine lender’s interest in the pledged eq-
uity would not be subject to any debts of the Owning SPE, but would
be subject to any debts of and liens and other transfers granted by the
Borrower SPE. With respect to a preferred equity investment, the
preferred equity investor will be structurally subordinate not only to
all of the debts of and liens and other transfers granted by the Bor-
rower SPE, but also to those of the Owning SPE. However, the case
of a preferred equity investment, under a properly structured pre-
ferred equity operating agreement, the Owning SPE would not have
any authority either in its own capacity or as the sole member of Bor-
rower SPE to incur or to cause the Borrower SPE to incur any mate-
rial indebtedness or to grant any liens or other transfers without the
prior consent of the preferred equity investor. Any material indebted-
ness, liens or other transfers incurred or granted by the Owning SPE
or the Borrower SPE upon Sponsor’s authorization but without the
requisite consent of preferred equity member would be subject to
challenge by the preferred equity member; and
(vii) a preferred equity investment is subject to the potential re-char-
acterization and distribution constraint risks discussed above, which
are not risks borne by the mezzanine lender in a typical transaction.
While not generally addressed in this article outside of some mention
in the section discussing potential re-characterization of preferred equity
and distribution constraints, the tax and accounting treatment of mezza-
nine loans and preferred equity investments and tax planning opportuni-
ties, including, without limitation, potential methods to minimize
differences in treatment between the different structures, should be re-
viewed by the transaction participants before finally settling upon a struc-
ture in any particular situation.
Like in many areas of law concerning various rights and remedies
under organizational documents, there are often few court opinions from
which to draw guidance. The authors have endeavored here to outline
what they deem the most reasonable prediction of how courts would treat
these issues. The equitable mortgage doctrine, sourced at common law for
the protection of unsuspecting and unsophisticated borrowers, has no
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place in a context of sophisticated market participants meeting their needs
through alternative financing strategies and who bargain for and under-
stand the terms of the agreements they undertake.
As the commercial real estate market continues to rebound after the
trough of the financial crisis, the importance of preferred equity invest-
ments and mezzanine debt has expanded. Fewer senior lenders are willing
to loan at such high loan-to-value ratios, the valuations pre-crisis that justi-
fied large loans no longer stand and therefore refinancing creditors are
unwilling to provide the loans to cover the outstanding amounts due on
loans based on such pre-crisis valuations. Thus a robust market has
emerged for private equity funds specializing in filling the gap in exchange
for lower priority positions that comport with the prohibitions against jun-
ior mortgages under the senior mortgages that are included in CMBS. This
study hopes to be timely and relevant to the practitioners working in this
fertile market.
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